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ABSTRACT
Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Detection, Identi cation, and Evaluation
Using Innate and Adaptive Immune Systems Interaction
Dia Al Azzawi
Abnormal flight conditions play a major role in aircraft accidents frequently causing loss of
control. To ensure aircraft operation safety in all situations, intelligent system monitoring and
adaptation must rely on accurately detecting the presence of abnormal conditions as soon as they
take place, identifying their root cause(s), estimating their nature and severity, and predicting their
impact on the flight envelope.
Due to the complexity and multidimensionality of the aircraft system under abnormal
conditions, these requirements are extremely difficult to satisfy using existing analytical and/or
statistical approaches. Moreover, current methodologies have addressed only isolated classes of
abnormal conditions and a reduced number of aircraft dynamic parameters within a limited region
of the flight envelope.
This research effort aims at developing an integrated and comprehensive framework for the
aircraft abnormal conditions detection, identification, and evaluation based on the artificial immune
systems paradigm, which has the capability to address the complexity and multidimensionality
issues related to aircraft systems.
Within the proposed framework, a novel algorithm was developed for the abnormal conditions
detection problem and extended to the abnormal conditions identification and evaluation. The
algorithm and its extensions were inspired from the functionality of the biological dendritic cells
(an important part of the innate immune system) and their interaction with the different
components of the adaptive immune system. Immunity-based methodologies for re-assessing the
flight envelope at post-failure and predicting the impact of the abnormal conditions on the
performance and handling qualities are also proposed and investigated in this study.
The generality of the approach makes it applicable to any system. Data for artificial immune
system development were collected from flight tests of a supersonic research aircraft within a
motion-based flight simulator. The abnormal conditions considered in this work include locked
actuators (stabilator, aileron, rudder, and throttle), structural damage of the wing, horizontal tail,
and vertical tail, malfunctioning sensors, and reduced engine effectiveness. The results of
applying the proposed approach to this wide range of abnormal conditions show its high
capability in detecting the abnormal conditions with zero false alarms and very high detection
rates, correctly identifying the failed subsystem and evaluating the type and severity of the failure.
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yawing moment coefficient with
respect to throttle deflection
CY Lateral force coefficient
CSM Costimulatory molecules
d Damage factor
da Lateral stick displacement [m]
de Longitudinal stick displacement [m]
dr Pedals displacement [m]
dT Throttle lever displacement [m]
D Drag force [N]
DR Detection rate
D Self/nonself discrimination matrix
Det Detection outcome
DQEE Decentralized quadratic estimation
error
Ev1 Qualitative evaluation outcome
Ev2 Direct quantitative evaluation outcome
Ev3 Indirect quantitative evaluation
outcome
FA False alarm rate
F Features set
F0 Nontriggered features matrix
F1 Triggered features matrix
F1M Current matrix-pattern matrix
F1P Current projection-pattern vector
F1' Current feature-pattern vector
FP Feature-pattern vector
H Altitude [m]
hVT Distance from the aerodynamic center






K Number of cytotoxic T-cellseK Number of residual cytotoxic T-cells
K Set of cytotoxic T-cellseK Set of residual cytotoxic T-cells
ÀL Distance from the aerodynamic center
of the left wing to the aircraft plane of
symmetry [m]
ÀR Distance from the aerodynamic center
of the right wing to the aircraft plane of
symmetry [m]
`eL Distance from aircraft center of gravity
to the axis of the left engine [m]
`eR Distance from aircraft center of gravity
to the axis of the right engine [m]
L Life of a dendritic cell
L Lift force [N]
xv
M Mach number
M Migration threshold of a dendritic cell
MI Margin index
MWF Pitching moment due to wing and
fuselage
MHT Pitching moment due to horizontal tail
MQEE Main quadratic estimation error
MP Matrix-pattern matrix
N Number of features
N Set of positive natural numbers
N0 Set of natural numbers
NACj Number of training patterns with
abnormal condition ACj
Nfs Number of training patterns with
failure severity fs
NF Number of failures
Nmax Maximum order of failure
NMDC Number of migrated dendritic cells
NRDC Number of regulatory dendritic cells
Ns Number of subsystems
Nss Number of subselves
NSDC Number of stimulatory dendritic cells
NNp Neural network output on roll channel
NNq Neural network output on pitch channel
NNr Neural network output on yaw channel
Nftk Number of failure types in subsystem k
OQEE Output quadratic estimation error
p Roll rate [rad/s]
Pp Roll acceleration [rad/s2]




q Pitch rate [rad/s]
Pq Pitch acceleration [rad/s2]
qref Reference pitch rate [rad/s]
r Yaw rate [rad/s]
Pr Yaw acceleration [rad/s2]
rref Reference yaw rate [rad/s]
R Number of suppressor T-cells
REI Range-exceedance index
R Set of suppressor T-cells




t Current sampling time [s]
T Thrust force [N]
T Size of the moving-time window
U Features coordinate space
VE Set of flight envelope variables
Vı Set of directly involved variables
V" Set of indirectly involved variables
V Aircraft ground velocity [m/s]
W0j Nontriggered confidence factor of
subself j
W1j Triggered confidence factor of subself j
x

Nominal range of variable x
x





˛ Angle of attack [rad]
ˇ Sideslip angle [rad]
  Set of feature constraints
ıa Aileron deflection [rad]
ıe Stabilator deflection [rad]
ır Rudder deflection [rad]
ıT Throttle
"a Aileron alteration factor
 Pitch attitude angle [rad]
 Sample mean
 Sample mean vector
 Air density [kg/m3]
 Sample standard deviation
† Sample covariance matrix
 Sample index in a moving-time
window
 Roll attitude angle [rad]
' Feature




ACDI Abnormal Conditions Detection and
Identification
ACDIE Abnormal Conditions Detection,
Identification, and Evaluation
ACDIEA Abnormal Conditions Detection,
Identification, Evaluation, and
Accommodation
ACDQE Abnormal Conditions Direct
Quantitative Evaluation
ACIQE Abnormal Conditions Indirect
Quantitative Evaluation
ACM Abnormal Conditions Management
ACQE Abnormal Conditions Qualitative
Evaluation
AIS Artificial Immune System
ANN Artificial Neural Networks
APC Antigen-Presenting Cell
CSUM Clusters Set Union Method
DC Dendritic Cell
DCA Dendritic Cell Algorithm
DIV Directly Involved Variable
EDIV Equivalent Directly Involved Variable
ERV Envelope Relevant Variables
FDIE Failure Detection, Identification, and
Evaluation
FDIEA Failure Detection, Identification,
Evaluation, and Accommodation
HMS Hierarchical Multiself
LSB Large Step Bias
LFDB Large Fast Drifting Bias
MHC Major Histocompatibility Complex
NS Negative Selection
PS Positive Selection
RDSUM Raw Data Set Union Method
SSB Small Step Bias
SFDB Small Fast Drifting Bias






Aircraft safety has been, and will continue to be, an important issue in both the commercial and
military aviation industries. Aircraft subsystem failures that result from various sources (such as
severe weather conditions, jammed control surfaces, malfunctioning sensors, structural damage
during air combat, etc.) may cause catastrophic accidents. Even with the most severe failures,
aircraft accident investigations showed that, in many cases, it would have been possible to avoid
the accident if the pilot would have taken proper actions at the appropriate time. Although some
experienced and highly-skilled pilots can compensate for some failures, they often experience stress
and confusion and, therefore, may not take proper actions within few seconds.
Several aircraft safety programs have been launched by research and professional agencies
aiming at improving post-failure flight safety. For instance, in the second half of the past decade,
NASA commenced the Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) project [1] in its Aviation
Safety Program (AvSP) to investigate and develop advanced flight controls that can be
implemented to enable safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions such as structural damage,
control surface failures, icing, or aerodynamic upsets. The Flight Mechanics Action Group
FM-AG(16), part of the Group for Aeronautical Research and Technology in EURope
(GARTEUR), has also launched a similar program [2].
Various technologies have been investigated to avoid unrecoverable flight conditions and
maintaining control of the aircraft in the presence of failures [3–6]. Fault-tolerant control
strategies have been an extensive research topic in failure accommodation [7–9]. However, such
strategies often require vital triggering tools that are intelligent enough in gathering the
information about the failed subsystem, the nature of the failure, and the severity of the failure as
soon as it takes place such that an accommodation strategy knows which of the remaining
resources must be used to accommodate the resulting changes in the system. In fact, this
information is important to the pilots too since it represents an alarm tool for their continuous
situation awareness.
The terms “fault” and “failure” are widely used in the literature to indicate that something is
wrong or abnormal in the system. To preserve the general meaning of the abnormal situation or
event, the term “abnormal conditions (AC)” will be adopted throughout this dissertation to refer
to faults and failures of the hardware, human pilot-related abnormal situations, operational upset
conditions, extreme environmental conditions, and any other situations that require specific
attention and/or action for safety purposes.
The process of detecting the presence of the AC, identifying the failed subsystem(s), and
evaluating the nature, severity, and repercussions of the AC is called abnormal conditions
detection, identification, and evaluation (ACDIE).
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An ideal aircraft ACDIE process must be fast enough in detecting the failure, identifying its
origin from other potential anomaly sources, and estimating the severity and nature of the failure
with minimum false alarms under normal operating conditions and high performance (detection
rate, identification rate, etc.) under abnormal flight conditions. Unreasonable delay in detecting
failures when they take place usually lead to undesired consequences such as stall events, loss of
control, and severe vibrations. The ideal ACDIE process must also be capable of detecting novel
failures and not misclassifying them as one of the known anomalies or as normal operation. It
should also be adaptive to system changes, robust to system disturbances and uncertainties, and
scalable to dimensionality changes of the system. In addition, an ideal ACDIE should be able to
detect and correctly identify multiple failures when they coexist in the system.
Most of the research efforts in the area of aircraft AC detection and identification (ACDI) have
considered only individual failures within limited regions of the flight envelope [10–12].
Evaluation of aircraft failures (in particular, flight envelope estimation and protection) have also
been conducted in the past several years [13–19]. Although they provided promising solutions to
some specific problems, they considered only few system parameters and addressed the evaluation
in a limited manner mostly outside the general context, which also includes abnormal conditions
detection, identification, and accommodation.
Generally speaking, ACDIE methodologies that are found in the literature can be divided into
two main categories: statistical and artificial-intelligence methodologies. Statistical methods are
either model-based or non-model-based. Model-based statistical methods require understanding
the physics of the system and rely on deriving functional relationships between the inputs and
outputs of the system. Diagnostic observers [20, 21], parity relations [22, 23], Kalman filters
[20, 24], and parameter estimation [25] are the mostly used model-based statistical methods for
the purpose of ACDIE. On the other side, non-model-based methods do not require physical
understanding of the system and rely on the availability of large amounts of data. Examples of
these methods are trend analysis [26, 27], statistical classifiers [28, 29], and partial least squares
[30]. Artificial intelligence methods used for the purpose of ACDIE include digraphs [31], which
are based on the cause-and-effect principle, logical fault trees [32], search techniques (such as
lookup tables and hypothesis-and-test search) [33], expert systems [34–36], and artificial neural
networks (ANN) [34, 37]. However, depending on the technique used, these methods partially
satisfy the ACDIE requirements that are of high importance in the aircraft system, as mentioned
previously.
Recent research studies [38–41] have acknowledged the need for an integrated and
comprehensive solution to the problem of aircraft AC detection, identification, evaluation, and
accommodation (ACDIEA) which takes into account the complexity and multidimensionality of
aircraft system.
For many years, the biological systems have provided a rich source of inspiration for engineers
and scientists in developing new algorithms and computing systems to solve real-life problems that
cannot be solved with conventional methods. These inspirations have led to the development of
artificial neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, swarm algorithms, and, most recently, artificial
immune systems (AISs).
The artificial immune systems, pioneered by Farmer, Packard, and Perelson’s work [42] in the
mid 80’s as a new computational paradigm in artificial intelligence, are “adaptive systems,
inspired by theoretical immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models,
which are applied to problem solving” [43]. The immunity-based fault detection operates in a
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similar manner as does the biological immune system—according to the principle of self/nonself
discrimination—when it detects exogenous antigens while not reacting to the self cells [44, 45].
Plenty of AIS algorithms have been developed in the past two decades and successfully
applied to various real-world problems including anomaly detection [46, 47], data mining
[48, 49], computer security [50], adaptive control [51, 52], and pattern recognition [53, 54]. In
fact, the complexity, adaptability, scalability, and robustness of the AIS make it an appropriate
choice for developing adaptive fault-tolerant system [55].
The AIS field is a relatively young field. New AIS algorithms and methods will be developed
in the future as new theories and discoveries in immunology appear since many of the observations
in this science are not yet fully understood and need solid explanation. For instance, most the
existing AIS algorithms have been inspired from the functionality of the components of the adaptive
immune systemwhile the innate immune systemwas totally obsolete until after the emergence of the
“Danger Theory” [56], where antigen-presenting cells (APCs), particularly, dendritic cells (DCs),
were emphasized to play a vital role in triggering the adaptive immune response. Later, researchers
proposed several algorithms based on the danger theory [57–61].
1.1. Research Objectives. .
The aircraft abnormal conditions management (ACM) consists of four major parts: detection,
identification, evaluation, and accommodation. Abnormal conditions detection is the process of
detecting the failure in the aircraft as soon as it takes place. Abnormal conditions identification is
the diagnostic process of isolating the failed subsystem (i.e., actuators, structures, sensors, and
propulsion). Abnormal conditions evaluation can be of qualitative or quantitative nature. The
qualitative evaluation is the assessment of the failure type. The quantitative evaluation assesses
the AC either directly or indirectly. The indirect quantitative evaluation estimates the severity of
the AC whereas the indirect quantitative evaluation determines the impact of the AC on the flight
envelope of the aircraft. Finally, the abnormal conditions accommodation is the adaptive control
of the aircraft system at post-failure.
This research presents an integrated immunity-based framework for aircraft ACDIEA with
novel ACDIE algorithms and approaches as indispensable prerequisites for a successful adaptive
failure accommodation.
This research aims at developing an integrated and comprehensive framework for aircraft ACM
based on the AIS paradigm to tackle the complexity and multidimensionality of the aircraft system.
Within this framework, the research aims at designing and implementing reliable and fast schemes
for detecting the occurrence of the AC, identifying the aircraft subsystem affected by the AC, and
evaluating the type and severity of that AC as indispensable prerequisites for a successful adaptive
AC accommodation. Finally, this research effort investigates the capability of AIS paradigm to
predict the effect of the AC on the flight envelope.
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1.2. Contributions. .
The main contributions of this research effort are
• developing an integrated, immunity-based framework for aircraft abnormal conditions detection,
identification, evaluation, and accommodation;
• design and implementation of the artificial DC mechanism for AC detection by mimicking the
behavior of the biological DCs and using the outcomes of the self/nonself discrimination within
the hierarchical multiself strategy;
• extending the artificial DC mechanism to the AC identification, qualitative evaluation, and direct
quantitative evaluation by exploiting the information gathered by the DCs about the AC and
converting the problem into a pattern recognition one; and
• developing AIS-based methods for post-failure flight envelope prediction under various failure
scenarios using analytical approaches with the AIS 2-D projections of the self/nonself.
The work related to the research effort presented in this study has resulted in the following
publications and submissions:
16. Perez, Andres, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Adil Togayev, and Dia Al Azzawi,
“Pilot-in-the-Loop Evaluation of a Bio-Inspired Adaptive Fault Tolerant Control System in a
Motion Based Flight Simulator,” submitted to AIAA Science and Technology Forum,
Kissimmee, Florida, Jan. 2015.
15. Perhinschi, Mario G., Dia Al Azzawi, Hever Moncayo, Andres Perez, and Adil Togayev,
“Immunity-Based Aircraft Actuator Failure Evaluation,” Journal of Aircraft Engineering and
Aerospace Technology, July 2014, submitted, Manuscript ID: AEAT-07-2014-0117.
14. Al Azzawi, Dia, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Andres Perez, and Adil Togayev,
“Comparison of Immunity-Based Schemes for Aircraft Failure Detection and Identification,”
submitted to IEEE Computational Intelligence Magazine, June 2014.
13. Perhinschi, Mario G., Dia Al Azzawi, Hever Moncayo, Adil Togayev, and Andres Perez,
“Immunity-Based Flight Envelope Prediction at Post-Failure Conditions,” submitted to AIAA
Journal of Aerospace Information Systems, June 2014.
12. Togayev, Adil, Mario G. Perhinschi, Dia Al Azzawi, Hever Moncayo, Israel Moguel, and
Andres Perez, “Immunity-Based Abnormal Condition Accommodation of Aircraft Subsystem
Failures,” submitted to ASME 2014 Dynamic Systems & Control Conference, San Antonio,
TX, Oct. 2014.
11. Perez, Andres, Hever Moncayo, Israel Moguel, Mario G. Perhinschi, Dia Al Azzawi, and Adil
Togayev, “Immunity-Based Adaptive Control Laws for Aircraft Fault Tolerance,” submitted to
ASME 2014 Dynamic Systems & Control Conference, San Antonio, TX, Oct. 2014.
10. Moguel, Israel, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Andres Perez, Dia Al Azzawi, and Adil
Togayev, “Bio-Inspired Approach for Aircraft Health Assessment and Flight Envelope
Estimation,” submitted to ASME 2014 Dynamic Systems & Control Conference, San
Antonio, TX, Oct. 2014.
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9. Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, Hever Moncayo, Adil Togayev, Andres Perez, and
Israel Moguel, “Evaluating Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Using an Artificial Dendritic Cell
Mechanism,” submitted to the 2nd International Conference and Exhibition on Mechanical &
Aerospace Engineering, Philadelphia, PA, Sept. 2014.
8. Moncayo, Hever, Israel Moguel, Mario G. Perhinschi, Dia Al Azzawi, Andres Perez, and Adil
Togayev, “Biologically-Inspired Approach for Aircraft Management Under Upset
Conditions,” submitted to the 2nd International Conference and Exhibition on Mechanical &
Aerospace Engineering, Philadelphia, PA, Sept. 2014.
7. Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Hever Moncayo, “Artificial Dendritic Cell
Mechanism for Aircraft Immunity-Based Failure Detection and Identification,” AIAA Journal
of Aerospace Information Systems, Vol. 11, No. 7, July 2014, pp. 536-550.
6. Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, Dia Al Azzawi, and Israel Moguel, “Generation of
Artificial Immune System Antibodies Using Raw Data and Cluster,” IC: International Journal
of Immune Computation, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2014, pp. 1–15.
5. Perhinschi, Mario G., and Dia Al Azzawi, “Undergraduate Experiential Learning Lab for
Aircraft Parameter Identification,” Computers in Education (CoED) Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2,
Apr.-Jun. 2014, pp. 79–92.
4. Moguel, Israel, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Andres Perez, Dia Al Azzawi, and Adil
Togayev, “Structured Nonself Approach for Aircraft Failure IdentificationWithin an Immunity-
Based Fault Tolerance Architecture,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems,
Jan. 2014, submitted, Manuscript ID: TAES-201400058.
3. Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, and Dia Al Azzawi, “Development of
Immunity-Based Framework for Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Detection, Identification,
Evaluation, and Accommodation,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and
Control Conference, Boston, MA, Aug. 2013.
2. Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Hever Moncayo, “Dendritic Cell Mechanism for
Aircraft Immunity-Based Failure Detection and Identification,” Proceedings of the AIAA
Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Boston, MA, Aug. 2013.
1. Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, and Dia Al Azzawi, “Integrated Immunity-Based
Framework for Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Management,” AIAA Journal of Aircraft, April
2013, accepted for publication, Manuscript ID: 2013-04-C032381.R1.
Finally, the following papers are under preparation:
1. Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Hever Moncayo, “Immunity-Based Approach for
Flight Envelope Prediction of a Supersonic Aircraft Under Faulty Sensors.”
2. Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, Hever Moncayo, and Andres Perez, “Flight Envelope
Prediction Assessment of an Aircraft Under Various Subsystem Failure.”
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1.3. Organization of this Dissertation. .
This dissertation is organized as follows. A concise background on immunology is introduced in
Chapter 2 with a survey of research efforts in the area of AIS. The survey is not comprehensive,
but it reviews the literature that is directly related to this work. Chapter 3 describes the
immunity-based framework for aircraft failure detection, identification, evaluation, and
accommodation. Clear definitions of the AIS self and nonself are also presented in Chapter 3.
Described in Chapter 4 are the experimental and simulation environment used in this work, the
aircraft model, the design of the flight simulation scenarios, and the simulated subsystem failures.
The selection of the aircraft AIS features and methods of generating the selves and nonselves are
discussed in Chapter 5. The immunity-based schemes and algorithms for abnormal conditions
detection, identification, and evaluation proposed in this work are presented in Chapters 6 to 8,
respectively. The results and their discussion are presented in Chapter 9. Finally, future research




Artificial intelligence strategies were developed aiming at finding solutions to a broad class of
complex problems, which could not be solved by traditional methods, such as linear, nonlinear,
multi-objective and dynamic programming, search trees, graph theory etc. The AIS is a relatively
new paradigm in the field of artificial intelligence inspired from the biological immune system.
Over the past decade, several AIS algorithms have been developed and applied to a wide range of
real-world problems including robotics and control, fraud detection, fault detection and
identification (diagnosis), scheduling, data mining, anomaly detection, classification,
optimization, machine learning, software testing, network security, computer virus and intrusion
detection, pattern recognition, and image processing [62].
AIS algorithms were inspired from the functionality of the different components in the
biological immune system and its response to the invading pathogens. The biological immune
system is divided into two equally important layers: innate and adaptive [63]. The former is the
natural system which we inherit from our ancestors and functions as the first line of defense
against an invading organism whereas the latter is the acquired system built through previous
exposure to infectious and other foreign agents. The innate immune system is always active and
responds immediately to any class of pathogen without distinction. On the other hand, the
adaptive immune system is normally silent and is much more potent in recognizing specific
antigens with slower response. The immune system is composed of cells that are developed from
stem cells in the bone marrow and differentiate into different populations, the most important of
which in the immune response are macrophages (Mˆs), dendritic cells (DCs), T-cells, and
B-cells. The Mˆ and DC populations form what is known as phagocytes (part of the innate
system) whereas populations of T-cells and B-cells form the lymphocytes (part of the adaptive
system).
Phagocytes reside in the peripheral tissues looking for antigens (Fig. 2.1). Proteins (or any
other markers) of an antigen are recognized by the surface of the phagocyte as the antigen touches
the phagocyte. Once recognized as a foreign material, the phagocyte engulfs the pathogen and
breaks it up into its constituent molecules. Special proteins in the phagocyte bind to subsets of
these molecules (specifically, peptides) and transport to the outer surface of the phagocyte along
with the bound antigen peptides (Fig. 2.2).
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Figure 2.1: Phagocytes in the Peripheral Tissue
Figure 2.2: A Dendritic Cell Processing an Antigen
These special proteins are called major histocompatibility complexes II (MHC II) and play a
critical role in activating the cell-mediated response of the adaptive system when the phagocyte
migrates from the peripheral tissues to the lymph nodes where lymphocytes reside. It is worth
mentioning here that B-cells process antigens in a very similar way to the phagocytes except that
phagocytes process general, non-specific antigens whereas B-cells can only process very specific
types of antigens. For this reason, phagocytes are called professional antigen presenting cells
(APCs). This communication is so crucial that the adaptive response cannot take place without
the innate response first.
It is well known in biology that DCs are more efficient APCs than Mˆs [64]. After they are
developed from stem cells in the bone marrow, DCs move to peripheral tissues that are in contact
with the environment such as skin and inner lining of the nose, lungs, stomach, intestines, and oral
cavities where they are in their initial “immature” state. They becomemature andmigrate to regions
rich in T-cells, primarily the lymph nodes, whether they have already captured and processed an
antigen or not (steady-state) [65]. In the lymph nodes, they either present peptides of the processed
antigen to the T-cells to activate the adaptive immune response or to induce immune tolerance to
“harmless” antigens, including those from the body’s own tissues, cells, and proteinswhich prevents
the immune response from attacking self cells, a disease known as autoimmunity [66, 67].
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T-cells, which mature in the thymus, exist in two main types in the lymph nodes: Helper
T-cells (Th) and cytotoxic T-cells (Tc). Referring to Fig. 2.3, when a DC migrates to the lymph
node carrying MHC II-peptide complexes, it attracts Th-cells to bind to that MHC II-peptide
complex. Note that only those Th-cells with receptors “specific” to the MHC II-peptide complex
of the migrated DC can bind to it. Once bound, a Th-cell is said to be activated, upon which it
proliferates and differentiates into “memory” Th-cells and “effector” Th-cells. Memory Th-cells
stay in the body for years to provide faster response when the same antigen infects the body once
again; this is a feature of the adaptive immune system the innate system lacks, where the adaptive
memory provides stronger and faster response which effectively stops the infection with less
reliance on the innate system when it occurs the second time. Effector Th-cells, on the other hand,
raise the alarm by releasing small cell-signaling protein molecules known as cytokines
responsible of activating both Tc-cells and B-cells. It is worth mentioning here that any infected
cell in the body displays peptides of the infectious antigen on their surface via MHC I (MHC I
molecules are displayed by any nucleated cell to enable the body to recognize infected cells
whereas MHC II molecules are displayed by APCs, such as DCs and Mˆs, and B-cells to
recognize epitopes of exogenous antigens and discriminate self from nonself). The role of the
Tc-cells is to kill the infected cells by binding its epitopes to that “specific” MHC I-peptide
complex and releasing special proteins that kill the infected cells. These proteins are the perforin
which inserts itself into the infected cell membrane and forms a pore and the granzyme which
induces apoptosis (the healthy programmed cell death) in the infected cell. This adaptive immune
response from T-cells is called cell-mediated response.
Figure 2.3: Activation of Th-, B-, and Tc-Cells by the APC
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B-cells, which mature in the bone marrow, carry “specific” protein complexes on their surfaces
known asmembrane-bound antibodies formed by shuffling the DNA during the maturation of these
B-cells. These antibodies bind to foreign pathogens with the same protein combination. Upon
binding, B-cells process the antigen in a similar way to that done by phagocytes, as mentioned
earlier, and display part of the processed antigen on their surface via the MHC II-peptide complex.
However, B-cells are not activated until they receive the cytokines released by the effector Th-cells
that are stimulated by the migrated DCs. When activated, B-cells proliferate and differentiate into
“memory” B-cells and “effector” B-cells. Like memory Th-cells, memory B-cells live for years in
the body to provide faster B-cell response in case the same pathogen invades the body once again,
while “effector” B-cells produce clones of their membrane-bound antibodies and release them as
free antibodies. One of the important functions of these free antibodies is opsonization, in which the
antibodies bind to foreign antigens and mark them for attack by phagocytes. The adaptive immune
response from B-cells is called humoral response.
The negative selection (NS) process, through which important constituents of the immune
system are generated, produces biological agents that have the capability to detect microbial and
non-microbial exogenous entities (referred to as nonself) while not reacting to the cells of their
own organism (referred to as self). Briefly, the process allows the proliferation of cells that do not
match the self, but match the nonself. Therefore, they are only compatible with the nonself and
will be capable to detect its presence. The concept is illustrated in Fig. 2.4, where the term
“antibodies” is used in a most generic way.
Figure 2.4: The Negative Selection Process
Segel and Cohen [68] examined how to use ideas from the biological immune system to solve
engineering problems and, inversely, how the AIS can inspire new conjectures to unrecognized
methods by which the immune system is organized.
Ko et al. proposed a general suppression framework based on the AIS discrimination
theory [69]. They designed a distributed control system based on their proposed framework to
control a modular self-reconfigurable hyper-redundant planar robotic manipulator.
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An artificial immune regulation (AIR) scheme was proposed and integrated into an immune
model-based fault detection approach for fault diagnosis [70]. This system generated residuals
that contained information about the faults. However, various disturbances and errors caused
residuals to become nonzero, thus interfering with detection of faults. The AIR scheme produced
a set of memory B-cells whose amount depended on several chemical rate constants. This helped
in classifying the residuals into distinct patterns, denoting different faulty situations.
Guzella et al. presented an immune-inspired approach for fault detection called dynamic effector
regulatory algorithm (DERA) [71]. The proposed approach integrates the role of regulatory T-cells
in control and signaling between cells. In DERA, new components of the immune system such as
cytokines and regulatory cells are incorporated in the model. DERA uses a population of regulatory
and effector cells and combines both positive and negative detection; it also keeps track of the
concentration of two cytokines in the environment. It is based on the assumption that there must
be an interaction between cells in the population before determining whether an antigen belongs to
self or nonself. The system possesses a memory that is represented by cytokine concentrations such
that the classification of an antigen depends on the responses against recently classified instances.
The system does not include clonal selection, thus the memory is not antigen specific. Unlike NS
algorithms, which look for a total coverage of the nonself space, DERA searches for an appropriate
distribution of effector and regulatory cells throughout the space. By combining both regulatory and
effector cells, to recognize normal and abnormal operation, respectively, DERA’s dynamic behavior
mediated by cytokines is able to indicate the severity of a fault. The proposed approach was tested
on the DAMADICS fault-detection benchmark problem, and it was able to attain considerably lower
false-positives than other approaches, because regulatory cells suppress the activation of effector
cells.
An immunized computational system (ICS) was proposed by KrishnaKumar and other
researchers [72–75]. They successfully tested ICS on an autonomous aircraft control problem.
Ootsuki and Sekiguchi suggested a method for determining control sequences of a sequential
control plant based on the immune system [76]. They used Petri nets with control sequences equal
to the firing sequences of a Petri net.
An aircraft fault detection system, called multilevel immune learning detection (MILD), was
developed to detect a broad spectrum of known as well as unforeseen faults [44]. Empirical study
was conducted with datasets collected through simulated failure conditions using National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames C-17 flight simulator. Three sets of
in-flight sensory information—namely, body-axes roll rate, pitch rate, and yaw rate were
considered to detect five different simulated faults: one for engine, two for the tails, and two for
the wings. The MILD implemented a real-valued negative selection (RNS) algorithm, where a
small number of specialized detectors (as signatures of known failure conditions) and a set of
generalized detectors (for unknown or possible faults) are generated. Once the fault is detected
and identified, an adaptive control system would use this detection information to stabilize the
aircraft by utilizing available resources (control surfaces). Experiments were performed with
datasets collected under normal and various simulated failure conditions using a piloted
motion-based NASA simulation facility.
Kaneshige and Krishnakumar demonstrated the potential of using immunized maneuver
selection in air combat maneuvers of a UAV [77]. They used a combination of genetic and
evolutionary algorithms in emulating the adaptive capabilities of the biological immune system to
construct the maneuvers that are necessary for responding to different air combat situations.
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Significant research efforts atWest Virginia University (WVU) have been focused on AIS-based
aircraft ACM. Perhinschi et al. proposed an integrated immunity-based framework for the detection,
identification, and evaluation of a wide variety of failures of aircraft subsystems [78]. Moncayo et
al. developed an immunity-based aircraft failure detection and identification scheme [79, 80]. They
proposed a hierarchical multiself (HMS) strategy where different self configurations are selected
for detection and identification of specific abnormal conditions. They have also proposed failure
evaluation over extended flight envelope based on the AIS paradigm [81]. The potential of the
artificial immune system to provide adaptive control of a UAV has been recently investigated by
augmenting an immunity-based mechanism to the nonlinear dynamic inversion (NLDI) of the UAV
in an attempt to provide adaptive control laws [82]. An evolutionary algorithm has been developed
for the generation and optimization of artificial immune system-based failure detectors using the
negative selection strategy [83, 84].
Based on Matzinger’s “danger theory” [56] in immunology, the dendritic cell algorithm (DCA)
has been recently developed [58], mimicking the functionality of the dendritic cells in the tissue
of the biological immune system. Since then, variants of the original algorithm were suggested
[59, 61]. These algorithms were applied to error detection in a mobile robotic system [60], robotic
classifier [85], anomaly detection in computer security [57], GPS multipath detection [86], pattern
recognition [87], and “healthy” model-based fault detection of analog circuits [88].
The danger theory has also inspired Pinto and other researchers to propose a fault detection
algorithm in telephone systems [89]. Each call in this fault-detection system is represented by an
antigen composed of linear attributes: origin, destination, duration of calls, and a nominal attribute.
Two signal levels were identified: signal 1 for perceiving the presence of the antigen and signal 2
for costimulation by using the noncompleted call rate. Signal 2 was responsible for alarming a
danger situation. Detector death, detector deactivation, detector population renewal, and a voting
routine were significantly employed in this work.
.
. CHAPTER 3
Immunity-Based Framework for Aircraft ACDIEA
This chapter presents an immunity-based framework for the aircraft ACDIEA problem. The chapter
starts with clear definitions of the various terms and components used in designing the framework,
then introduces the general architecture of the aircraft ACM process. It should be noted that the
targeted system in this work is the aircraft, including its subsystems (such as the actuators, sensors,
propulsion, etc.), the human pilot, and the environment. However, the framework is generally
formulated and can be applied to any other system.
3.1. De nitions and Basic Concepts. .
Definition 3.1: Abnormal Conditions Detection.
The AC detection is the recognition of the presence of an abnormal condition in at least one of






Definition 3.2: Abnormal Conditions Identification.
The AC identification is the diagnostic process which pinpoints to the root cause of the AC once
they are detected. In other words, the AC identification isolates the failed subsystem(s) after
the declaration of an AC. The identification outcome, Idt, can be expressed as
Idt =





1 if subsystem j is under AC,
0 otherwise,
(3.2)
where Ns is the number of subsystems.




id1 id2    idNsf
i
, (3.3)
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Depending on the complexity of the targeted system, the AC identification may be performed in
several phases. For example, in the case of elevator’s failure of an aircraft, the first identification
phase isolates the actuators as the failed subsystem whereas the second phase determines the
elevator as the failed actuator and, finally, the third phase pinpoints to whether the failed elevator
is the left or right one.
Definition 3.3: Abnormal Conditions Qualitative Evaluation.
The AC qualitative evaluation (ACQE) is the determination of the failure type. The outcome
of the qualitative evaluation, Ev1, is an integer labeling the type of failure out of a list of Nftk
failure types associated to each subsystem k = 1, 2, : : : , Ns, such that
Ev1 2 f1, 2, : : : , Nftkg . (3.5)
Note that the set of all AC for all subsystems is
F = f fi
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,NFg , (3.6)





As an example of the ACQE, consider two different types of the elevator’s failure: locked at
a trim position (type 1) and moving and locked at non-trim position (type 2). If the second
type is the actual failure of the elevator, then the outcome of the qualitative evaluation must be
Ev1 = 2.
Definition 3.4: Abnormal Conditions Direct Quantitative Evaluation.
The AC direct quantitative evaluation (ACDQE) is the determination of the failure magnitude
(or severity). The outcome of the direct quantitative evaluation, Ev2, can take a numerical value
representing the magnitude of the AC. For example, an outcome of
Ev2 = 20% (3.8)
in the case of wing failure represents the percentage area of the wing affected by structural
damage. Generally speaking, the numerical representation is difficult to achieve, therefore, the
ACDQE may, alternatively, provide a severity estimate mapped on a discrete set. For example,
Ev2 2 flow severity, medium severity, high severityg , (3.9)
where each severity scale maps to a range of actual failure magnitudes. Another alternative is
to formulate the ACDQE outcome as a fuzzy set expressed as
Ev2 = fyi
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,mg , (3.10)
where yi are fuzzy membership values with respect to the m linguistic values associated to
the severity metric (e.g., low severity, medium severity, and high severity). Ev2 can also be
expressed as a scalar by using a defuzzification algorithm:
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Ev2 = D fyi
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,mg , (3.11)
whereD is the defuzzification operator.
Definition 3.5: Abnormal Conditions Indirect Quantitative Evaluation.
The AC indirect quantitative evaluation (ACIQE) is the re-assessment of the flight envelope and
prediction of the limitations and constraints on the performance and handling qualities inflicted
by the presence of the AC. The outcome of the indirect quantitative evaluation, Ev3, typically






i = 1, 2, : : : ,NE
	
, (3.12)
where NE is the number of the flight envelope variables.
Definition 3.6: Abnormal Conditions Accommodation.
The AC accommodation is the adaptation of the system to the AC to keep it under control and
complete the mission. It can be passive or active. Passive accommodation reprocesses the
ACDIE outcomes to deliver warnings and information displayed in the cockpit in a form that is
easy for the pilot to realize. Active accommodation involves triggering of direct compensating
modules as integral part of the control laws and/or actual computation of commands at post-
failure conditions.
Definition 3.7: Features.
The features are the variables of the system that are expected to capture the fingerprints of all
AC considered, in terms of their occurrence, nature, and severity. They can be (sub)system
states, inputs, control system variables, estimated values, etc. The set of all features
F = f'i
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,Ng (3.13)
defines an N-dimensional hyper-space referred to as the universe, U. An orthogonal
coordinate system, equally denoted U, with its origin at O = 0 is associated to this
hyper-space. A feature point, P, is the set of simultaneous values of all features 'i that can be
obtained through measurements or simulation, at normal or abnormal conditions. The position









Definition 3.8: Self and Nonself.
The self, S, is defined as the hyper-subspace of all possible feature points at normal conditions.
All other points in U form the nonself, OS. Therefore,
S [ OS = U and S \ OS = ¿. (3.15)
The threshold between self and nonself (i.e., between normal and abnormal conditions) is
represented by an N-dimensional surface
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Subselves are lower-dimensional projections of the self. Consider a 2-dimensional projection
(or subself) defined by features '1 and '2. For clarification, and without loss of generality, let
the projection be represented by straight line segments as shown in Fig. 3.1. Note that feature
values are typically normalized and the resulting hyper-cube represents a working sub-region
in U. The set of all possible feature points collected at normal conditions defines Area 0. Any
point outside Area 0 belongs to the nonself OS and a failure may be declared. However, a feature
point that falls inside Area 0 does not necessarily signify normal conditions. AC for which
the dynamic fingerprints depend on one or more other features may produce projections inside
Area 0.
Figure 3.1: Self/Nonself 2-Dimensional Projection
A complete detection is said to be possible if all feature points under AC fall inside the
nonself. The order of an AC is defined as the minimum number of features necessary to
completely detect that AC. For example, a first order failure would require only one feature,
', for detection. Referring to Fig. 3.1, if Area 1 is the projection of all points under a certain
AC, then that AC is of first order with ' = '1. Similarly, Area 2 represents a second order
AC and Area 3 represents a third or higher order one. Furthermore, a first order AC requires at
least one feature for detection. For instance, the AC represented by Area 1 in Fig. 3.1 can be
completely detected using the 2-dimensional self defined by '1 and '2, as well as only the
1-dimensional subself defined by '1, whereas the 2-dimensional self is sufficient to completely
detect the AC represented by Area 2. Using the subself defined by '1 will never succeed in
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detecting the AC represented by Area 2. On the other hand, using the subself defined by '2
allows detection in some instances, but not a complete detection. Using the 2-dimensional self
to detect the third failure will not ensure a complete detection. However, it should be noted
that, in practice, the approach may provide very high detection rates for such cases too, if the
feature points that are projected inside the self can be reached with very low probability.
Definition 3.10: Directly Involved Variable.
A directly involved variable (DIV) in the AC is that variable whose abnormal variation is
directly and significantly the result of the AC. In other words, a DIV is a variable that captures
the dynamic fingerprint of the AC. It may belong to the features set F that define the self and
nonself. For example, in the case of the left aileron being locked, the DIV can be defined as
the left aileron deflection, ıaL, which obviously characterizes the aileron failure. However, this
variable might not belong to the features set defining the self/nonself.
Definition 3.11: Equivalent Directly Involved Variable.
An equivalent directly involved variable (EDIV) is a variable that belongs to the features set F
and reflects the abnormal variation of the DIV, which does not belong to the features set. Back
to the locked left aileron example, the EDIV which captures the abnormal variation of ıaL could
be the lateral stick displacement, da, which belongs to the features set defining the self/nonself.




defines the relationship between ıaL and da. The importance of
defining EDIVs in a particular AC is to enable the use of certain 2-dimensional projections for
predicting the post-failure flight envelope, as will be discussed Sec. 8.3.
3.2. Architecture of the AIS-Based Aircraft ACM. .
The AIS-based aircraft ACM includes three main components functionally connected in a closed
loop as shown in Fig. 3.2:
• offline ACM system design and implementation,
• online ACDIEA, and
• post-processing of flight data and ACDIEA outcomes.
Figure 3.2: The AIS-Based Aircraft ACM
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The outcome of the offline ACM system design and implementation is the development of an
integrated and comprehensive ACDIEA scheme. The design depends on a clear definition of the
aircraft subsystems that are targeted, the types of the AC (including known and unknown failures),
the severity scales of the AC, the flight envelope variables, and the nature and level of the passive
and active accommodation. The development of the ACDIEA scheme requires the availability of
large amounts of measured data that must be pre-processed for self/nonself generation. The block
diagram of the ACM design component is presented in Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Of ine ACM System Design and Implementation
One of the most critical steps in the design of the ACM system is the selection of features.
The features selected for generating the self/nonself must be relevant to all four components of the
ACDIEA. Their number and nature depend on the aircraft subsystems that are targeted, the types of
the AC, the severity scales of the AC, the flight envelope variables, and the nature and level of the
passive and active accommodation. For a comprehensive and integrated approach, all states, inputs,
and variable parameters of all subsystems considered must be taken into account. It should also be
noted that a complete detection of an N-th order AC requires N relevant features and, therefore, an
N-dimensional self. If the number of subsystems considered is Ns, then the states Xi, inputs Ui, and
other relevant parameters Pi corresponding to subsystem i, can be expressed as
Xi =

xi1 xi2    xiNsi

, (3.17)
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Ui =






pi1 pi2    piNpi

, (3.19)
respectively. For any subsystem i, the maximum order an AC can have is
Ni = Nsi + Nui + Npi. (3.20)
Therefore, for complete detection of all AC from an exhaustive set of AC, the number of necessary





Nsi + Nui + Npi

, (3.21)
where the -variables exclude duplication among the subsystems. If all states, inputs, and other
parameters are distinct, then
Nsi = Nsi, Nui = Nui, Npi = Npi. (3.22)
Otherwise, the -variables can be given by, for example,
Nzi =
(
Nz1 for i = 1,
Nzi – n for i > 1,
(3.23)
where z = s, u, or p and n is the number of duplicate states for each subsystem, i.e., the states
with the property that xij 2 Xi and xij 2 Xi–1. It can be easily noticed that the number of necessary
features N and, hence, the dimensionality of the self/nonself can become excessively large and
create significant computational problems [78]. These problems can be avoided under certain
conditions by using lower-dimensional subselves within a HMS strategy [79].















If Nmax = N, then a complete detection of failure fm can only be obtained, in general, with an
N-dimensional self. In some cases, not all of the lower-dimensional projections can capture the
fingerprint of the AC. For example, consider the hypothetical 3-D self shown in Fig. 3.4. An AC
feature point AC1 is projected outside all the three 2-D projections. Feature point AC2 is projected
outside one of the (N–1)-dimensional subselves. For specific shapes of the self/nonself, it is possible
that some AC feature points are projected inside all subselves as illustrated by feature point AC3.
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Figure 3.4: Potential of Subselves to Capture the Abnormal Conditions
If Nmax < N, then a complete detection of fm can be obtained by using an Nmax-dimensional
subself with proper features. In this case, the N-dimensional self does not need to be considered. A
complete detection for all failures can be obtained by using all possibleNmax-dimensional subselves.
The approach is conservative and some of the subselves may be ignored or replaced by lower-
dimensional subselves without loss of performance.
The order of an AC is often difficult (or even impossible) to determine; therefore, Nmax may
be unknown. In this situation, a low value for Nmax may be assumed and the self/nonself can be
generated as the set of all possible Nmax-dimensional subselves, with the observation that the higher
the assumed value of Nmax, the higher the likelihood of better performance. The total number of
possible Nmax-dimensional subselves for N features is given by








Feature points that are collected under normal conditions and have common predefined properties
are usually grouped to form self clusters. These clusters can be geometrically shaped as hyper-
rectangles, hyper-spheres, or hyper-ellipsoids. Feature points that do not fall on any of the self
clusters are also clustered with the same shape to form the antibodies. These antibodies may be
directly used in the AC detection, where they are referred to as detectors. The structured nonself
approach [90] can be used to restructure subsets of the antibodies by adding information to them
such that they can be used in the AC identification, evaluation, and accommodation. In this case,
the antibodies are referred to as identifiers, evaluators, and compensators, respectively.
The online ACDIEA process implies the real time operation of the ACDIEA schemes. Sets of
current values of the features measured in flight at a certain sampling rate are compared against the
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detectors, identifiers, evaluators, and compensators and the outcomes of theACDIEA are generated.
These outcomes are transferred to the pilot, the on-board monitoring and recording system, and the
automatic fault tolerant control laws. The block diagram of the online ACDIEA component is
presented in Fig. 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Online ACDIEA Scheme
The post-processing of ACDIEA outcomes and the analysis of false alarms and failed detections
in conjunctionwith current measured values of the features can potentially be used tomodify/extend
the sets of detectors, identifiers, evaluators, and compensators and improve the overall performance.
The block diagram of the post-processing component is presented in Fig. 3.6.




Experimental and Simulation Environment
4.1. WVU Motion-Based Flight Simulator. .
The WVU motion-based flight simulator system used in this research is shown Fig. 4.1. The
simulator includes a 6-DOF motion platform driven by electrical induction motors (shown in
Fig. 4.2), laminar research X-Plane flight simulation software, LCD mosaic wall four-monitor
external visual display, instructors operating station, and computer and control cabinet.
Figure 4.1: The WVU 6-DOF Motion-Based Flight Simulator
The motion platform provides adequate 6-DOF translational and rotational motion cues.
Electrical motors are used to drive the motion base, which represents a very versatile and
inexpensive solution to this type of application. Motion drive algorithms convert the motion of
the aircraft as resulting from the dynamic model into motion of the platform such that the
perception of the pilot is optimized within the physical limitations of the ground based simulator.
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Figure 4.2: The Actuators of the WVU Motion-Based Flight Simulator
The simulator has been interfaced [91] with an external computer (see Fig. 4.3) on which the
aircraft model can be run within the Matlab®/Simulink® environment to drive the entire simulator
system. Pilot input signals are transferred from the simulator cockpit into the Matlab®/Simulink®
model. The outputs of this model are sent to X-Plane [92], for the control of all the simulator
subsystems including the generation of visual cues. However, the connection of X-Plane to the
motion computer is deactivated and the signals from the 20 external computer are sent directly to
the motion computer, which drives the motion base. This setup allows the use of any Simulink
aircraft model including customized failures to drive the simulator.
Figure 4.4 shows the top level Simulink diagram of the model interfaced with the WVU Flight
Simulator. The model includes the nonlinear dynamics of a supersonic fighter (as described in
Sec. 4.2) and models failure/damages of actuator, sensors, wing, and engine. The three large blocks
at the bottom of the figure include the computation of specific variables to be provided to the flight
simulator to drive the generation of visual and aural cues as well as the motion of the simulator
platform.
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Figure 4.3: Interface of the WVU Flight Simulator with External Models [93]
Figure 4.4: Top Level Simulink Model Interfaced with WVU 6-DOF Flight Simulator [91]
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4.2. The Aircraft Model. .
The aircraft model used in this work is a supersonic fighter NASA IFCS F-15 research aircraft.
The aircraft aerodynamic model is derived from a nonlinear model of a high performance military
aircraft distributed by NASA to academic institutions in 1990 within a student design competition
[94]. This generic model was customized through the addition of the aerodynamics modeling of
canard surfaces for the purpose of simulating the NASA IFCS F-15 research aircraft [95]. The
aerodynamic and thrust characteristics are provided through 42 lookup tables: 16 tables for the
longitudinal dynamics as functions of Mach number, angle of attack and stabilator deflection, 20
tables for the lateral-directional dynamics as functions of Mach number, angle of attack, sideslip
angle and rudder, and 2 tables for engine thrust and fuel flow as functions of Mach number and
altitude. Additional lookup tables have been added for the modeling the canards. The lookup
tables have been subdivided to isolate the contribution of individual aerodynamic surfaces and
control surfaces in order to be able to simulate structural damage and control surface failure.
The aircraft includes model following adaptive control laws based on nonlinear dynamic
inversion and ANN augmentation which also produces estimates of aircraft angular rates and
angular acceleration errors that are used as features [96].
4.3. Modeling of Aircraft Subsystem Abnormal Conditions. .
The aircraft subsystems and the failure types considered in this effort are summarized in Table 4.1.
Four major subsystems were modeled to support the development and testing of the AIS-based
FDIE scheme: actuators, sensors, structure, and propulsion.
A total of 30 failures were simulated for the 19 subsystems, as shown in the table. The failure
modeling of each of the main subsystems is briefly described next.
Table 4.1: The Aircraft Subsystems and Their Failure Types
Main
Subsystem k Subsystem ACj Failure Type
Actuators
1 Left Stabilator 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
2 Right Stabilator 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
3 Left Aileron 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
4 Right Aileron 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
5 Left Rudder 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
6 Right Rudder 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
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Table 4.1 – Cont’d.
Main
Subsystem k Subsystem ACj Failure Type
Actuators
7 Left Throttle 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
8 Right Throttle 1 Locked at current trim position
2 Moving and locking at non-trim position
Sensors
9 Roll Rate Sensor 1 Sensor bias
2 Constant sensor output
10 Pitch Rate Sensor 1 Sensor bias
2 Constant sensor output
11 Yaw Rate Sensor 1 Sensor bias
2 Constant sensor output
Structure
12 Left Wing 1 Missing part
13 Right Wing 1 Missing part
14 Left HorizontalTail 1 Missing part
15 Right HorizontalTail 1 Missing part
16 Left Vertical Tail 1 Missing part
17 Right VerticalTail 1 Missing part
Propulsion 18 Left Engine 1 Reduced effectiveness
19 Right Engine 1 Reduced effectiveness
Ns = 19 NF =
NsX
k=1
Nftk = 2  8 + 2  3 + 1  6 + 1  2 = 30
1. Actuators: The actuators considered are the aerodynamic control surfaces (stabilator, aileron,
rudder, and throttle). A jammed control surface for an airplane is a control surface that is locked
at a certain deflection and can no longer be moved. The deflection at post-failure condition
can be the one existing at the moment of the failure occurrence or the surface can move to a
failed position within the deflection range of the surface and remain there. This failure does
not alter the aerodynamic characteristics of the control surface and can be simulated by simply
disconnecting the corresponding input to the aircraft dynamic system and keeping it constant.
However, each surface in a pair (left and right) will have different deflections and the resulting
moments and forces must be computed individually. The aerodynamic lookup tables have been
divided such that the contribution of each individual control surface is isolated [97].
2. Sensors: The malfunction of the sensors for which the outputs are used in the control laws
feedback may have a significant impact on the overall performance of the system, potentially
leading to catastrophic system failure. The sensors considered are the roll, pitch, and yaw rate
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gyros. Several types of failures have been modeled and implemented for these sensors [98],
including large and small step bias, large and small fast drifting bias, and large and small slow
drifting bias.
A step bias occurs when a sensor continuously reports a constant offset from the correct
value. For example, the pitch rate sensor is indicating the aircraft is pitching upward at a certain
constant rate when the aircraft is actually in steady-state level flight. A large step bias or a small
step bias indicates the relative magnitude of the sensor failure.
Drifting bias arises when the sensor values are increasing or decreasing at a constant rate
from the actual values until a bias saturation level is reached. Large drifting bias and small
drifting bias are relative indications to the severity of the failure. Furthermore, fast drifting bias
and slow drifting bias quantify how fast the saturation level is reached.
3. Structure: A simple model of wing damage is developed considering both aerodynamic and
gravimetric effects. The failure type corresponds to a total or partial physical destruction
and/or deformation of the wing and different percent values along the wing can be selected as
damage affected area. In addition, the effect of this type of failure on the ailerons control
(physically damaged aerodynamic control surface) has been modeled for certain wing damage
percentages. At post failure conditions, the asymmetry of aerodynamic forces produced by the
left and right aerodynamic surfaces requires that the aircraft forces and moment computation
be adjusted. An additional rolling moment is introduced due to the asymmetric lift produced
by the damaged semi-wing, and an additional yawing moment due to the asymmetric drag
produced by the damaged semi-wing.
4. Propulsion: Reduced control efficiency corresponds to the situation when less additional thrust
is produced by the same displacement of the throttle control. This failure is modeled by scaling
down the throttle input by a constant factor depending on the severity of the failure (percentage
loss of efficiency) [94].
4.4. Flight Simulation Scenarios. .
To define the AIS self/nonself as completely and accurately as possible, adequate coverage of the
feature space must be achieved. Different flight scenarios are considered over a wide range of the
flight envelope, which is first defined based on the nine reference points shown in Fig. 4.5 for Mach
numbers between 0.6 and 0.9 and altitudes between 9,000 ft and 31,000 ft. All flight tests start at
steady state flight condition at point 1 and continue to cover the nine points as described by the
arrows. For example, one flight test starts at point 1, the aircraft is accelerated at constant altitude
to point 4, descended at constant speed to point 5, and then returned to points 4 and 1. A total of
eight such tests are necessary to cover the testing flight envelope. The data collected from flight
tests under normal conditions with these points were used to build the self/nonself of the aircraft.
Additional intermediate points (A, B, C, and D in Fig. 4.5) were used to provide validation data.
The set of flight scenarios, lasting between 10 and 20 minutes each, are designed to include
steady-state flight conditions, transitions between steady-state conditions, and mild to moderate
maneuvers. These flight scenarios are simulated under normal flight conditions. They are repeated
under various failure scenarios for both design/development and validation purposes. Only one
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failure at a time is considered to capture/isolate the dynamic fingerprint of each type of failure and
generate antibodies appropriately. The data acquisition rate from the simulator is 50 Hz.




Generation of the Self and Nonself
Generating the self, S, requires collecting large amounts of measured feature values at normal
conditions, ideally covering the entire flight envelope. In practice, these N-dimensional feature
points are usually clustered using a clustering algorithm. Self clusters are geometrical hyper-bodies
that can typically take one the following shapes:
• Hyper-cubes—determined by an N-dimensional center and one value for the side;
• Hyper-rectangles—determined by an N-dimensional center and N values for the sides;
• Hyper-spheres—determined by an N-dimensional center and one value for the radius;
• Hyper-ellipsoid of rotation—determined by anN-dimensional center and two values for the axes;
• Generalized hyper-ellipsoid—determined by an N-dimensional center and N values for the axes.
Similar hyper-bodies are used to represent the nonself, OS, and will be referred to as antibodies.
These antibodies primarily serve as detectors of the AC. The geometrical shape of these hyper-
bodies can potentially affect the efficiency of the detector generation and the performance of AC
detection [99]. They determine how well the nonself is covered, how many detectors are necessary,
and how intensive the computational process is.
For all shapes, except hyper-spheres, variable orientation can be considered as determined by
an additional N-dimensional vector. For example, for the hyper-spherical representation with Nc
clusters, ci, the set of self clusters can be expressed as






'1i '2i    'Ni Rci

, (5.1)
where Ci is the center and Rci is the radius of self cluster i. For the same hyper-spherical
representation with Nd detectors, dj, the set of detectors can be expressed as






'1j '2j    'Nj Rdj

, (5.2)
where Dj is the center and Rdj is the radius of detector j.
When generating the self and the nonself, the following optimization criteria should be
considered [78, 83, 84]:
• no overlapping among detectors and self clusters;
• minimum empty space in the self clusters;
• minimum uncovered areas in the nonself;
• minimum overlapping among self clusters;
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• minimum overlapping among detectors;
• minimum number of detectors (note that this criterion may be constrained by imposing a
maximum size for the detectors in order to achieve a desirable resolution).
Two alternative methods can be used for generating the self and nonself [100]: the raw data
set union method (RDSUM) and the cluster set union method (CSUM). The block diagram
summarizing both methods is shown in Fig. 5.1. In the first method, all raw test data available are
collected in one file before a set of antibodies is generated. In the second approach, the processing
of smaller individual sets of data is performed by clustering the data sets and then combining the
clusters in a single set for antibodies generation. Using the two approaches, data for each
combination of features corresponding to a particular projection are processed separately to
produce a set of antibodies by covering the respective nonself. These methods are presented in
Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Figure 5.1: Two Methods for AIS Antibodies Generation
5.1. Features Selection. .
The candidate parameters for self/nonself generation of the supersonic aircraft model described in
Sec. 4.2 can be grouped in the following five categories:
• Aircraft state variables.
• Pilot input variables.
• Stability and control derivatives.
• Variables generated within the control laws.
• Derived variables.
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The aircraft state variables are a natural choice since measurements of aircraft angular rates
have been used for self/nonself definition and failure detection with promising results [78].
Intentional pilot input may reproduce the dynamic fingerprint of some failures on
lower-dimensional projections. The stability and control derivatives may also provide useful
information regarding subsystem failures [101]. It should be noted that determining them online
is not trivial and they have not been considered in this work.
The ANN control augmentation implemented within the model provides useful signals with
significant ACDIE capabilities; in particular, the NN outputs and their derivatives have ACDIE
potential [95]. Since the adaptation activity increases after the occurrence of a failure, these signals
capture the increased adaptation activity and, thus, can detect the failure.





































































are neural estimates of the angular rates based on sensor measurements including the













estimates of the angular rates based on sensor measurements that do not include the respective
gyro, over a specified time window.
Table 5.1 lists all the F-15 aircraft features used for the AIS development.
Table 5.1: The AIS Development Features of the Supersonic Aircraft
ID Feature Description
1 pref Reference roll rate
2 qref Reference pitch rate
3 rref Reference yaw rate
4 NNp Neural network output on the roll channel
5 NNq Neural network output on the pitch channel
6 NNr Neural network output on the yaw channel
7 MQEE Main quadratic estimation error
8 OQEE Output quadratic estimation error
9 DQEEp Decentralized quadratic roll rate estimation error
10 DQEEq Decentralized quadratic pitch rate estimation error
11 DQEEr Decentralized quadratic yaw rate estimation error
12 V Ground velocity
34 Chapter 5. Generation of the Self and Nonself
Table 5.1 – Cont’d.
ID Feature Description
13 ˛ Angle of attack
14 ˇ Sideslip angle
15 p Roll rate
16 q Pitch rate
17 r Yaw rate
18  Roll attitude angle
19  Pitch attitude angle
20  Yaw attitude angle
21 H Altitude
22 Pp Roll acceleration
23 Pq Pitch acceleration
24 Pr Yaw acceleration
25 ax Longitudinal acceleration
26 ay Lateral acceleration
27 az Vertical acceleration
28 da Lateral stick displacement
29 de Longitudinal stick displacement
30 dr Pedal displacement
31 dT Throttle displacement
32 M Mach number
5.2. Raw Data Set Union Method. .
The RDSUM processes experimental data at normal conditions in four main modules, as shown in
Fig. 5.1:
1. Generation of Single Data File: Raw data from different flights or simulator tests are combined
in one single data file. The data are left intact and no further processing is performed here.
2. Data Preprocessing: Preprocessing of the data includes two steps: normalization and
duplicate elimination. The raw data received from the data fusion component are normalized
between 0 and 1. Therefore, the feature space becomes a unit hypercube. The normalization
factor for each dimension is determined as the span of the flight data plus a percentage margin.
Duplicate points of the normalized data are then eliminated to reduce the size of the data file.
This process decreases the amount of storage and computing resources needed, while
preserving the information content of the data. Note that implicit duplicate point elimination
may also take place during the clustering process, which follows.
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3. Self Data Clustering: The data produced from the previous processing component define self
points that need to be represented by a definite number of geometric hyper-bodies, referred to
as clusters. This can be done by using the k-means clustering algorithm. A modified version of
this algorithm [96] was used to represent the clusters as hyper-spheres, but they could also be
represented as hyper-rectangles or hyper-ellipsoids.
4. Generation of Antibodies: Self clusters are used to generate antibodies by covering the nonself
hyper-space with hyper-bodies similar to the clusters. An enhanced negative selection algorithm
for real-valued representation with variable nonself radius (ENSA-RV) [96] was used for the
purpose of this research. The algorithm ensures that there is no overlapping with the self and
that the nonself is covered to a desired predetermined level. It should be noted that the algorithm
requires a number of specific parameters that must be carefully selected and correlated. The
antibodies generation process can be stopped after a prescribed number of iterations when a
preset maximum number of acceptable detectors is reached or when a desired coverage of the
nonself is achieved.
5.3. Cluster Set Union Method. .
The mechanism to generate antibodies using the CSUM is based on a 5-phase/modules process
that uses an optimized algorithm to fuse different sets of clusters generated from single sets of
experimental flight or simulation data. The main components of this methodology are described
next.
1. Preliminary Data Processing: If the amount of experimental is large enough to exceed the
available computer memory, within this approach, the data can be split in subsets and the
following steps in the process can be applied to the individual smaller data sets. Pre-processing
of the data includes two steps: normalization and data preparation for clustering. As a result of
the normalization, the values of each measured feature are scaled to values between 0 and 1
and, as is the case with the previous approach, the feature space becomes a unit hypercube.
The normalization factor for each dimension is determined as the span of the flight data plus a
percentage margin. Alternatively, desired maximum and minimum values can be specified in
the computation of the normalization factor. Note that when multiple sets of experimental data
are used for antibodies generation, the same normalization factors must be used for all data.
2. Clustering of Individual Data Sets: This module is similar to the previous approach; however,
the clustering algorithms are applied to the individual smaller sets of experimental data. Note
that parallel computation may be used to perform this phase.
3. Clusters Set Union: Once several sets of clusters have been generated, a fusion process is
performed that consists of set union accompanied by overlapping elimination.
4. Clusters Duplicate Elimination: The overlapping between clusters is estimated in a similar
way as between the detectors, where a minimum overlapping threshold of a detector with
respect to the others is allowed during the process. Since the radius of each cluster is known,
the overlapping between a current cluster and the nearest one(s) can be determined. The
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distance between centers must be greater than or equal to the sum of the radii of the clusters
minus the permitted overlapping threshold. This approach favors clusters with bigger radii and
will preserve for the final self-representation those clusters with more efficient coverage. The
approach allows the update of the database when new flight tests are available by clustering
only the newly acquired data and then putting old and new clusters together and eliminating
any duplication.
5. Generation of Antibodies: The same enhanced negative selection algorithm for real-valued
representation with variable detector radius (ENSA-RV) [96] is applied to the cluster union set
generated in the previous module. The algorithm ensures no overlapping between detectors and
self clusters and minimizes the uncovered areas in the nonself.
5.4. The Hierarchical Multiself Strategy. .
The HMS strategy, proposed in [79], attempts to mitigate the dimensionality issues associated to
the high-dimensional self by using lower-dimensional projections for ACDIE. Considering the
different level of capabilities of the lower-dimensional projections in capturing the fingerprint of
an abnormal condition, the projections are assigned confidence factors (weights) and used in
hierarchical configurations for the three ACDIE processes. With the HMS strategy, the ACDIE
scheme is capable of detecting and identifying a large variety of AC of the main aircraft
subsystems over a wide range of severity. Figure 5.2 illustrates the block diagram of the HMS
strategy for the online ACDIE.
Figure 5.2: Hierarchical Multiself Strategy for Online ACDIE
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5.5. Self/Nonself Analysis Tool. .
Visualizing the 2-dimensional subselves is very helpful in analyzing how well the self clusters and
detectors are generated using one of the methods discussed in the previous sections. A simple
interactive tool (see Fig. 5.3) was developed to analyze all the generated 2-D subselves and project
a given flight test data on these subselves in order to validate them before adopting them as a basis
to the ACDIE schemes.
Figure 5.3: The Interactive Tool for Self/Nonself Analysis
The tool is user friendly and has the following main components referenced in Fig. 5.3:
1. “Data folder” textbox to specify the fully-qualified path of the main folder containing all the
flight tests and the self/nonself data generated.
2. Two listboxes of features containing the features listed in Table 5.1. Any feature selected from
the left listbox represents the abscissa of the 2-D plot and any feature selected from the right
listbox represents the ordinate.
3. “Flight test” dropdown menu containing all available flight tests.
4. Three checkboxes providing options for plotting flight test data points on the figure, plotting
self/nonself generated with the CSUM method (use ERAU data checkbox), and plotting post-
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failure flight envelope ranges.
5. Two optional textboxes to specify the starting and ending time steps used in plotting flight test
data points. If these textboxes are empty, all data points in the selected flight test will be plotted.
6. An optional dropdown menu to quickly plot the selected 2-D projection.
7. An X-Y plot area onto which the self clusters, nonself shapes, and (optional) flight test data are
plotted.
The zooming feature of the analysis tool facilitates the validation of the self/nonself generation
process such as how well the detectors cover the nonself space, whether the method has generated
self clusters within the specified margins or not, whether detectors overlapping is reasonable or
not, whether there are issues with the self generation method (or its underlying processes) or with
the flight data, etc. For instance, one might conclude from Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 that there is an issue
with the self generating process. However, checking the range (minimum and maximum values) of
pref in the original flight data used in generating the subselves and the corresponding range in the
selected flight test reveals that the maximum value used in the flight test was higher than that used
in the original flight data. This explains why there are few test points outside the self clusters in
Fig. 5.4.
Figure 5.4: The Zooming Action of the Interactive Tool for Self/Nonself Analysis
.
. CHAPTER 6
Immunity-Based Abnormal Conditions Detection
Detecting the presence of an AC is the first and critical step in the ACM process. Without a
reliable and fast detection scheme, the AC identification and evaluation schemes will not provide
timely and reliable outcomes as expected and, eventually, the AC accommodation will not
properly compensate for the abnormal variations in the system parameter(s) that are affected by
the AC. This chapter introduces the basic concept of self/nonself discrimination and discusses its
general applicability to the AC detection. From the immune system point of view, the self/nonself
discrimination relies on the functionality of the antibodies generated in the adaptive immune
system to detect the existence of the antigens. Due to the computational issues involved in
generating the self and nonself, a perfect definition of the self clusters and the antibodies is very
difficult to achieve in practice. Recalling the additional issues that may arise from the
lower-dimensional projections of the self, as discussed in Chapter 3, the self/nonself
discrimination may lead to false alarms and/or missed detections. However, investigations within
this research effort have shown that false alarms and missed detections can be reduced by properly
processing the outcomes of the self/nonself discrimination. This has led to the development of a
novel computational algorithm for AC detection inspired from recent findings in immunology that
the immune response is governed by the interaction of the various components of both the innate
and adaptive immune systems [102, 103]. In particular, dendritic cells in the innate immune
system play a major role in activating special populations of T-cells in the adaptive immune
system as well as interacting with the antibodies in attacking the invading antigens. Section 6.2
presents the artificial DC mechanism which processes the outcomes of the self/nonself
discrimination, within the HMS strategy, to minimize the false alarms and increase the detection
rate.
6.1. Self/Nonself Discrimination. .
The discrimination between the self and nonself is a fundamental concept in the AIS field. The
outcome of the AC detection can be obtained based on two mechanisms that distinguish between
the self and nonself, namely, the positive selection (PS) and negative selection (NS).
In the PS mechanism, the measured features point, P, is compared against the self clusters.
Assuming hyper-spherical self clusters as defined by Eq. (5.1), the detection outcome at each sample









8 i = 1, 2, : : : , Nc, (6.1)
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where rOPt is the position vector of the measured feature point as given by Eq. (3.14) relative to the
origin O of the coordinate system U.
On the contrary, the NSmechanism compares themeasured features point, P, with the detectors.
If the detectors are defined as in Eq. (5.2), then the NS mechanism provides the detection outcome









8 j = 1, 2, : : : , Nd. (6.2)
If the HMS strategy with Nss subselves is used, then either Eq. (6.1) or (6.2) has to be applied for








If the self and nonself are perfectly defined, the discrimination between them would definitely
provide the desired outcome of the AC detection. If, on the other hand, a perfect definition of the
self/nonself is unattainable, false alarms and/or missed detections are inevitable. However,
excessive false alarms and missed detections can be minimized if the outcomes of the self/nonself
discrimination are processed in a certain way before providing the detection outcome. This can be
achieved by incorporating an additional detection logic to provide the detection outcome as a
function of current and past discrimination outcomes within the HMS strategy. Within this
research effort [104, 105], it was revealed that such a detection logic can be inspired from the
functionality of the biological dendritic cells in the innate immune system and their interaction
with the different components of the adaptive immune system. The next section presents an AC
detection algorithm based on the DC mechanism.
6.2. The Arti cial Dendritic Cell Mechanism for AC Detection. .
The various significant components of the biological immune system serve as sources of inspiration
for mathematical and computational elements pertinent to aircraft abnormal condition detection and
identification within the AIS paradigm. These correspondences are summarized in Table 6.1 and
will be further explained throughout this section.
Table 6.1: The Biological Terms and Their AIS Paradigm Representations
Biological Term AIS Paradigm Representation
Self or Organism Data clusters of feature values acquired from development tests undernormal operating conditions
Nonself or Antibodies Complementary clusters of self clusters that function as detectors in theself/nonself discrimination process
Antigen Set of feature values in a validation test
DC Computational unit that processes the outcomes of the self/nonselfdiscrimination process
Regulatory DC Computational unit that votes a normal condition
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Table 6.1 – Cont’d.
Biological Term AIS Paradigm Representation
Stimulatory DC Computational unit that votes an abnormal condition
Costimulatory Molecules Number of times a computational unit has been selected for processingthe inputs
DC Life Number of times allowed for the computational unit to be selected forprocessing the inputs
Interleukin-10 Counter of number of zeros in a self/non-discrimination outcomeprocessed by the computational unit
Interleukin-12 Counter of number of ones in a self/non-discrimination outcomeprocessed by the computational unit
Regulatory T-Cells Number of computational units voting a normal condition over a movingtime window
Stimulatory T-Cells Number of computational units voting an abnormal condition over amoving time window
The artificial DC mechanism proposed here is a novel computational algorithm inspired from
the functionality of the biological DCs in the tissue and their interaction with with T-cells and
antibodies in the adaptive immune system [104, 105]. Cells from a pool of DCs are randomly
selected to process the outcomes of the self/nonself discrimination process. Some cells migrate
to the lymph node (the adaptive immune system) with an indication of abnormal conditions and
stimulate the adaptive immune system to generate cytotoxic T-cells, whereas other cells migrate
with an indication of normal conditions and stimulate the adaptive immune system to generate
suppressor T-cells to regulate the generated cytotoxic T-cells. This stimulation/suppression of the
cytotoxic T-cells determines the resultant response of the adaptive immune system, which indicates
whether the system is under normal or abnormal conditions. The block diagram of the algorithm
is illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
The inputs to the algorithm are the outcomes of the self/nonself discrimination over a moving
time window of size T. Let these outcomes be defined as Det j, where  = 1, 2, : : : , T and
j = 1, 2, : : : , Nss, and let Dt and Dt be the discrimination matrices defined by
Dt =
S1 S2    SNss2666664
3777775
Det11 Det12    Det1Nss
Det21 Det22    Det2Nss
... ... . . . ...
DetT1 DetT2    DetTNss
, Det j =
(
0 if P j is inside Sj ,
1 if P j is outside Sj ,
(6.4)
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Dt =
S1 S2    SNss2666664
3777775
Det11 Det12    Det1Nss
Det21 Det22    Det2Nss
... ... . . . ...
DetT1 DetT2    DetTNss
, Det j =
(
0 if P j is outside Sj ,
1 if P j is inside Sj .
(6.5)
Figure 6.1: Block Diagram of the Arti cial DC Mechanism for AC Detection
Note that Dt is the complement of Dt. Each column of matrix Dt is a set of detection outcomes
of a particular subself over the entire time window. Ideally, all elements of this matrix are equal to
zero under normal conditions and one under abnormal conditions. In practice, Dt usually contains
both zeros and ones whether the time window is under normal or abnormal conditions due to
imperfections in designing and building the subselves and/or due to the shape of the self that may
project abnormal condition feature points onto the self area [106]. This situation may lead to false
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alarms and missed detections, if not properly handled.
A pool containing a setC ofNDC immature artificial DCs is first initialized with each cellC` 2 C
(` = 1, 2, : : : , NDC) having the data structure shown in Fig. 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Data Structure of an Arti cial Dendritic Cell
At each sample time, a random number of DCs is selected from the pool and each selected DC
processes the input discrimination matrices, Dt and Dt, and updates its data structure as follows:
1. Costimulatory Molecules, CSM: These are secreted proteins that appear on the surface of
the biological DC. The concentration of these proteins increases whenever the DC processes a
substance, regardless whether it is a harmful antigen or not. Similarly, when an artificial DC
receives the input Det j, the new CSM value becomes
CSM = CSM–1 + 1, (6.6)
regardless of the value of the input Det j. All DCs in the pool are initialized with CSM = 0.
2. Interleukin-10, IL10: These are special cytokines that are produced by the biological DC when
the substance is suspected to be either part of the self or a foreign, but harmless, one. Similarly,
when an artificial DC receives an input Det j = 0, the new IL12 value becomes






W01 W02    W0Nss
T is a vector of confidence factors such that W0j 2 0, 1
to take into consideration the different level of capabilities of the subselves to capture the
fingerprint of the normal condition. All DCs in the pool are initialized with IL10 = 0.
3. Interleukin-12, IL12: These are special cytokines that are produced by the biological DC when
the substance is suspected to be either an antigen or a foreign harmful one. Similarly, when an
artificial DC receives an input Det j = 1, the new IL12 value becomes






W11 W12    W1Nss
T is a vector of confidence factors such that W1j 2 0, 1
to take into consideration the different level of capabilities of the subselves to capture the
fingerprint of the abnormal condition. All DCs in the pool are initialized with IL12 = 0.
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4. Life, L: Like any other cell in the body, the biological DC experiences a healthy programmed
cell death [63]. In the artificial DC mechanism, this can be done by assigning a random positive
integer to each DC in the pool representing the life remaining for that DC to keep processing the
input of the next time step. Each DC then updates its life property according to
L = L–1 – 1. (6.9)
5. Migration Threshold, M: When the concentration of the CSM reaches a certain level, the
biological DC becomes mature and migrates from the tissue to the lymph node in order to
present the information they have collected about the processed substance to the adaptive
immune system. Similarly, an artificial DC is said to be mature when its CSM reaches a
predefined migration threshold, M. Each DC in the pool is initialized with a random migration
threshold.
6. Triggered and Nontriggered Features Matrices: When a biological DC engulfs the antigen,
it breaks it up into its constituent molecules and moves them to the outer surface of the DC
which helps the adaptive immune system to recognize the type of the antigen presented by the
DC. Similarly, an artificial DC presents information about the processed input by constructing
the triggered features matrix, F1, to record the number of times subself Sj is triggered and the
nontriggered features matrix, F0, to record the number of times subself Sj is not triggered. These
matrices are defined as
F1 =
S1 S2    SNss2666664
3777775
F11 F12    F1Nss '1
F21 F22    F2Nss '2
... ... . . . ... ...
FN1 FN2    FNNss 'N
, F0 =
S1 S2    SNss2666664
3777775
F11 F12    F1Nss '1
F21 F22    F2Nss '2
... ... . . . ... ...
FN1 FN2    FNNss 'N
, (6.10)
whereFij = Fij+1 if 'i is one of the feature coordinates of the triggered subselfSj andFij = Fij+1
if 'i is one of the feature coordinates of the nontriggered subself Sj.
Any DCwhichmigrates to the lymph node (i.e., the adaptive immune system) with IL12  IL10
is called stimulatoryDC since it activates the production of cytotoxic T-cells in the adaptive immune












F (m)ij , (6.11)
where NSDC is the number of stimulatory DCs and Ki is the number of cytotoxic T-cells
corresponding to feature 'i.
On the other hand, any migrated DC with IL12 < IL10 is called regulatory DC since it
activates the production of suppressor (regulatory) T-cells in the adaptive immune system. The
set of activated suppressor T-cells can be expressed as












F (m)ij , (6.12)
where NRDC be the number of regulatory DCs and Ri is the number of suppressor T-cells
corresponding to feature 'i.
The role of the suppressor T-cells is to regulate the adaptive immune response by suppressing
an equal number of activated cytotoxic T-cells which results in a set of residual cytotoxic T-cells
given by eK = ˚eKi = Ki – Ri ˇ̌ i = 1, 2, : : : , N	 . (6.13)
This stimulation/suppression of the cytotoxic T-cells determines the resultant response of the
adaptive immune system, which indicates whether the system is under normal or abnormal
conditions.
Once all the elements of the discrimination matrices, Dt and Dt, are processed as described












Immunity-Based Abnormal Conditions Identi cation
The AC identification is the diagnostic process which isolates the subsystem that is mostly affected
by the detected AC. In addition to its robust capability of detecting the intruders, the biological
immune system is also capable of correctly identifying both the intruder and the infected area in
the body. In particular, the peptides that appear on the surface of a mature DC are specific to the
invading antigen [63]. Similarly, the migrated DCs in the artificial DC mechanism presented in
Chapter 6 carry information that is useful in identifying the failed subsystem [104, 105]. This
information is summarized by the triggered-features matrix, F1, defined in Eq. (6.8). Moreover,
three patterns can be extracted from the F1 matrices of the migrated DCs, depending on how F1 is
viewed: features pattern, projections pattern, and matrix pattern. These patterns can be generated
both offline and online. Patterns that are generated offline using training tests are called reference
patterns. It should be pointed out here that the AC identification requires establishing Ns different
reference patterns, one associated to each subsystem. Patterns that are generated online either
during a simulation test or from recorded validation tests are called current patterns. Thus, using
the artificial DC mechanism converts the AC identification into a pattern recognition problem in
which the failed subsystem is identified as the one for which the reference pattern best matches the
current pattern.
7.1. The Features-Pattern Approach. .
In this approach, the features are used to define the pattern. For the j-th AC ( j = 1, 2, : : : , Nftk), a
reference pattern may be established in terms of how strongly each feature is affected by the AC. In




m1 m2    mN
T , mi 2 0, 1 . (7.1)
Considering that each subsystemmay be affected bymore than one AC and assuming superposition,
the features-pattern vector can be defined for each subsystem k as
FPk =
PNftk
j=1 FPACjPNftkj=1 FPACj =
h
m1 m2    mN
i
, (7.2)





All these membership values can be determined from tests and/or heuristics. Note that binary logic
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can be used instead of fuzzy logic. In this case, mi 2 f0, 1g and mi 2 f0, 1g.
At each sample time, after an AC is detected, the current features pattern can be obtained from







INssPNMDCm=1 F (m)1  INss , INss 2 f1gNss1 , (7.3)
where the norm in the denominator is the Euclidean norm. Note that Eq. (7.3) can be used to define
the reference features pattern, as it will be shown in Sec. 7.4. Also note that both Eqs. (7.2) and
(7.3) define normalized vectors so that they can be compared without bias to the actual magnitudes
of their corresponding elements.
At this point, a pattern recognition algorithm is required in order to determine which of the










1 if FPk best matches F1' ,
0 otherwise.
(7.5)
7.2. The Projections-Pattern Approach. .
The projections-pattern approach is analogous to the features-pattern approach with the exception
that the reference and current patterns are defined based on the projections (i.e., subselves) that are
triggered during the detection phase. For the j-th AC (j = 1, 2, : : : , Nftk), the vector of membership
values of each projection to the set of AC-relevant projections (projections that can capture the
dynamic fingerprint of the AC) is defined as
PPACj =

n1 n2    nNss
T , ni 2 0, 1 . (7.6)
Considering again that each subsystem may be affected by more than one AC and assuming
superposition, the projections-pattern vector can be defined for each subsystem k as
PPk =
PNftk
j=1 PPACjPNftkj=1 PPACj =
h
n1 n2    nNss
i
, (7.7)





All these membership values can be determined from tests, analysis, and/or heuristics. Binary logic
can be used here as well, for simplicity.
At each sample time, after an AC is detected, the current projections pattern can be obtained
from the triggered-feature matrices of all migrated DCs as








IN PNMDCm=1 F (m)1  , IN 2 f1g1N , (7.8)
where the norm in the denominator is the Euclidean norm.
Similar to the features-pattern approach, Eq. (7.8) can be used to define the reference projections
pattern. At this point, a pattern recognition algorithm is required in order to determine which of
the PPk vectors of Eq. (7.7) best matches F1P. Once the pattern is recognized, the outcome of the
AC identification is obtained as
Idtt =







1 if PPk best matches F1P,
0 otherwise.
(7.10)
7.3. The Matrix-Pattern Approach. .
Thematrix-pattern approach combines both the features- and projections-pattern approaches. Here,
the patterns are established based on the entire matrix F1. For each subsystem k, both the FPk and
PPk vectors must be defined using the algorithms presented in the previous sections to eventually


















if 'j is one of the feature coordinates
of the triggered subself Sj,
0 otherwise.
(7.12)
At each sample time, after an AC is detected, the sum of F1 matrices for all migrated DCs can be




F (m)1 . (7.13)
Aswas the case in the first two approaches, using a pattern recognition algorithm to determinewhich
of the MPk matrices of Eq. (7.11) best matches F1M provides the outcome of the AC identification
as
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Idtt =







1 if MPk best matches F1M,
0 otherwise.
(7.15)
7.4. The AC Identi cation Scheme Using the DC Mechanism. .
The three approaches described in the previous sections need a pattern recognition algorithm to
recognize the current patterns produced by the migrated DCs. In machine learning, there are
many pattern recognition algorithms among which the naïve Bayes classifier is the most popular
one. Naïve Bayes classifier is a probabilistic supervised learning algorithm which provides very
high classification rate with very fast training and validation phases in most practical applications.
Besides, the classifier provides an automated way of establishing the reference patterns. These
advantages of the classifier make it the most suitable algorithm for the purpose of pattern
recognition of the AC identification problem. The reader is referred to Appendix A for detailed
derivation of the classifier probabilistic models.
This section describes the AC identification scheme using the features-pattern approach.
However, the scheme is not limited to the features-pattern approach; any of the other approaches
(i.e., the projections-pattern or the matrix-pattern) can be used instead.



























x1 x2    xN
iT
is the vector of continuous values of N attributes to be classified
into subsystem k, Nk is the number of samples in subsystem k, k is the sample mean vector, and
†k is the sample covariance matrix.
Once the mean vectors and covariance matrices are known, the classifier model of Eq. (7.16)
can be used to calculate the discriminant functions of all subsystems for the current x. The best-









The mean vectors and covariance matrices are obtained by training the classifier offline against
samples from a set of training tests. Referring to Fig. 7.1, the training phase is summarized by the
following steps:
1. For each subsystem k, prepare a set of training flight tests.
2. For each training test, run the DC algorithm for detection. When a failure is detected, compute
xk = F1' using Eq. (7.3).
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Figure 7.1: Training the Naïve Bayes Classi er for AC Identi cation
Obviously, the mean vectors and covariance matrices implicitly define the reference features
pattern, FPk, as a function of the training current features pattern. After constructing all the
reference patterns, the classifier can be used online to recognize the failed subsystem from the
current feature patterns in a given AC test as follows (see the Fig. 7.2):
1. Whenever the DC algorithm for detection declares a failure, compute xk = F1' using Eq. (7.3).




from Eq. (7.16) using the mean vectors and covariance
matrices calculated in the training phase.
3. Use Eq. (7.17) to determine the failed subsystem k.
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Figure 7.2: AC Identi cation Scheme Using the Dendritic Cell Mechanism
.
. CHAPTER 8
Immunity-Based Abnormal Conditions Evaluation
Aircraft AC evaluation is a vital prerequisite to a successful post-failure accommodation. AC are
evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative evaluation determines the type of
the failure, whereas the quantitative evaluation estimates the severity of the failure (direct
quantitative evaluation) and the limitations of the flight envelope at post-failure (indirect
quantitative evaluation). It should be noted that correct flight envelope estimation requires correct
evaluation of both the type and severity of the AC once the failed subsystem is correctly identified.
Extensions of the DCmechanism, introduced in Chapter 6, to the ACQE and ACDQE problems
are presented in this chapter. Similar to the DCmechanism for identification presented in Chapter 7,
the patterns carried by the migrated DCs are used to define the reference patterns by retraining the
pattern recognition algorithm for each problem separately [107]. The three pattern approaches
discussed in Chapter 7 can be applied to both ACQE and ACDQE. However, only the features-
pattern approach will be discussed here, since using the projections-pattern or the matrix-pattern
follow the same logical steps. Section 8.3 presents an immunity-based approach for the post-failure
flight envelope prediction under various failure scenarios of the aircraft subsystems.
8.1. Abnormal Conditions Qualitative Evaluation. .
The ACQE starts once an AC is detected, assuming correct detection. Within the HMS strategy, the
ACQE can be formulated as a pattern recognition problem, where the pattern represents the level
of impact of the AC on each feature. Therefore, patterns for AC qualitative evaluation purposes
corresponding to each type of failure of the affected subsystem can be defined based on the detection
outcome of all subselves, which is summarized by the F1 matrix provided by the migrated DCs.
If the number of AC of subsystem k is Nftk, then Nftk different reference patterns should be
established: one associated to each type of failure. The reference features-pattern vector for the
failure type can be expressed as
FPACj =







are fuzzymembership values of each feature with respect to the set of EDIVs (see
Definition 3.11). They can be determined, in general, from analysis, tests, and/or heuristics. Each
membership valuemi can be associated to the level of triggering of all projections corresponding to
the respective feature, of which F1 matrices provide a measure. This allows the reference features-
pattern vector to be determined by training the naïve Bayes classifier offline in a similar fashion to
that described in Sec. 7.4. The training samples from a set of training tests are represented by the
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current features-pattern vectors provided by the triggered-features matrices of all migrated DCs as
in Eq. (7.3). Figure 8.1 illustrates the block diagram of the training phase of the classifier.
Figure 8.1: Training the Naïve Bayes Classi er for ACQE
The online ACQE starts immediately after a failure is declared by the DC mechanism. The
current features-pattern F1' of Eq. (7.3) is computed and compared to the library of reference




















where NACj is the number of training patterns, x = F1' , and ACj and †ACj are the mean vector and
































The block diagram of ACQE scheme described in this section is shown in Fig. 8.2.
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Figure 8.2: ACQE Scheme Using the Dendritic Cell Mechanism
8.2. Abnormal Conditions Direct Quantitative Evaluation. .
Similar to the ACQE, patterns for each failure severity can be defined based on the detection
outcome of all subselves based on the F1 matrices of the migrated DCs. If the number of severity
scales of failure ACj is Nfs, then Nfs different reference patterns must be established: one
associated to each severity scale. The reference features-pattern vector corresponding to the
failure severity ACj& can be expressed as
FPACj& =
 em1 em2    emN T , (8.5)
where emi 2 0, 1 are fuzzy membership values of each feature with respect to the set of EDIVs
(see Definition 3.11).
The reference features-pattern of Eq. (8.5) can be determined through a training process with
experimental or simulation data under failure exposed to the artificial DC mechanism. The naïve
Bayes classifier described previously can be used to construct these reference patterns by training
the classifier offline against samples from a set of training tests of known failure severity scales.
Training the classifier for ACDQE is very similar to training it for ACQE as shown in the schematic
diagram of Fig. 8.3.
The online ACDQE starts immediately after a failure is declared by the DC mechanism. The
current features-pattern F1' of Eq. (7.3) is computed and compared to the library of reference




















where Nfs is the number of samples in tests with failure severity fs, x = F1' , and fs and †fs are the
mean vector and sample covariance matrix given by
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The block diagram of ACDQE scheme is presented in Fig. 8.4.
Figure 8.4: ACDQE Scheme Using the Dendritic Cell Mechanism
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8.3. Abnormal Conditions Indirect Quantitative Evaluation. .
The presence of AC in one or more of the subsystems of an aircraft may result in detrimental effects
on the flight envelope and, consequently, the overall safety of the aircraft and capability to complete
the mission. To support the AC accommodation, it is highly desirable to estimate the achievable
flight envelope at post-failure. Within the immuntiy-based ACDIE framework proposed in this
work, this section presents an AIS-based approach for flight envelope estimation under various AC
of the aircraft subsystems.
The approach requires defining a set of DIVs (see Definition 3.10) for each failed subsystem
along with a set of envelope related variables (ERVs) that could be affected by the AC and
establishing analytical relationships between the DIVs and EDIVs (see Definition 3.11) so that
the post-failure ranges can be extracted from the 2-D subselves in which an EDIV is one of its
coordinates and an ERV is the other coordinate.
Let Vı = fvıi
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,Nıg be the set of DIVs that characterizes the AC and let
VE = fvEi
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,NEg be the set of ERVs that could be affected by that AC such that
VE  FE  F, where FE is the set of ERVs for all subsystems. Since, by definition, the DIVs do
not necessarily belong to the features set F that define the self/nonself, it is necessary to find a
function that maps vıi … F to an EDIV which belongs to F and, subsequently, extracting the
post-failure range of the ERV from the corresponding 2-D subself if there is a mutual constraint
between the two features involved in the projection. Note that special attention should be paid to
the case when such a constraint does not exist, since values of one of the features can cover the
entire nominal range regardless of the value of the other feature and, therefore, the post-failure
range of the ERV cannot be obtained from the corresponding 2-D subself in this case.
To illustrate the approach, suppose vı1 … F is the only DIV that characterizes a hypothetical
failure which takes place when vı1 = c, where c is some constant. In order to estimate the post-
failure range of the envelope variable vE1 using one of the 2-D projections of the self/nonself, then
vE1 should be one of the coordinates of that projection and the other coordinate should be an EDIV,













ci satisfies  ig , (8.9)
where  i = fi1
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,N ig is the set of constraints produced by the AC on the set of EDIVs
defined by V" = fv"i
ˇ̌
i = 1, 2, : : : ,N"g. This concept is illustrated in Fig. 8.5.
The immunity-based ACIQE scheme described here is generally formulated and can be applied
to any system. However, the relationships between the DIVs to EDIVs are application specific and
obtaining them often requires analysis of the system under consideration.
For the F-15 aircraft model, these relationships can be obtained from analyzing the aircraft
dynamics for each failed subsystem individually. Table 8.1 presents typical lists of the DIVs,
EDIVs, and ERVs for each failed subsystem. Note that in this context the flight envelope of this
aircraft is defined by the sixteen-features set
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The rest of this section is devoted to the derivation of the DIV-EDIV relationships for each of the
subsystems listed in Table 8.1.
Figure 8.5: Post-Failure Flight Envelope Estimation Using the AIS Paradigm
Table 8.1: The Indirect Quantitative Evaluation Variables for the Supersonic Aircraft
kF k Failure Type Vı V" VE
1 1 Left Stabilator Locked ıeL de H, M, p, q, Pq
2 1 Left Stabilator Lockedand Moving ıeL de H, M, p, q, Pq
3 2 Right Stabilator Locked ıeR de H, M, p, q, Pq
4 2 Right Stabilator Lockedand Moving ıeR de H, M, p, q, Pq
5 3 Left Aileron Locked ıaL da p, Pp
6 3 Left Aileron Locked andMoving ıaL da p, Pp
7 4 Right Aileron Locked ıaR da p, Pp
8 4 Right Aileron Lockedand Moving ıaR da p, Pp
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Table 8.1 – Cont’d.
kF k Failure Type Vı V" VE
9 5 Left Rudder Locked ırL dr r, Pr
10 5 Left Rudder Locked andMoving ırL dr r, Pr
11 6 Right Rudder Locked ırR dr r, Pr
12 6 Right Rudder Lockedand Moving ırR dr r, Pr
13 7 Left Throttle Locked ıTL dT ax, az, r, H, M
14 7 Left Throttle Locked andMoving ıTL dT ax, az, r, H, M
15 8 Right Throttle Locked ıTR dT ax, az, r, H, M
16 8 Right Throttle Lockedand Moving ıTR dT ax, az, r, H, M
17 9 Roll Rate Sensor Bias pmeas da p, Pp
18 9 Roll Rate SensorConstant Output pmeas da p, Pp
19 10 Pitch Rate Sensor Bias qmeas de q, Pq
20 10 Pitch Rate SensorConstant Output qmeas de q, Pq
21 11 Yaw Rate Sensor Bias rmeas dr r, Pr, ˇ
22 11 Yaw Rate SensorConstant Output rmeas dr r, Pr, ˇ
23 12 Left Wing PartiallyMissing
CLWL,
CmWL
de, da, dr, dT H, M, p, q, Pp, Pq
24 13 Right Wing PartiallyMissing
CLWR,
CmWR
de, da, dr, dT H, M, p, q, Pp, Pq
25 14 Left Horizontal TailPartially Missing CLHL de, da H, M, p, q, Pp, Pq
26 15 Right Horizontal TailPartially Missing CLHR de, da H, M, p, q, Pp, Pq
27 16 Left Vertical TailPartially Missing CLVL da, dr, dT p, r, Pp, Pr
28 17 Right Vertical TailPartially Missing CLVR da, dr, dT p, r, Pp, Pr
29 18 Left Engine ReducedEfficiency TL dT ax, az, r, H, M
30 19 Right Engine ReducedEfficiency TR dT ax, az, r, H, M
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8.3.1. Locked Stabilator
For a locked stabilator failure, there is only one DIV:
Vı =
(
fıeLg for left stabilator failure,
fıeRg for right stabilator failure.
(8.11)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fdeg and VE = fH, M, p, q, Pqg , (8.12)
respectively.
In the following analysis, the elevator deflection is considered positive when it is deflected
downward such that it produces negative pitching moment, as shown in Fig. 8.6.
Figure 8.6: Sign Convention for Elevator De ections (Left View)
The longitudinal stick displacement is assumed to be given by the relationship
de = keıe, (8.13)































for right stabilator failure.
(8.16)
where ıeLF is the value at which the left elevator is locked and ıeRF is the value at which the right
elevator is locked. These values can be obtained from the outcome of the ACDQE.
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The post-failure range of de in Eq. (8.16) is virtual since the pilot is still capable of moving
the stick to its extremities. If the left and right stabilators have identical ıe ranges under normal
conditions, then the post-failure range of the longitudinal stick displacement for the left stabilator













F, the post-failure ranges for H, M, q, and Pq may be found from the
corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
The asymmetry induced by a locked stabilator produces an adverse rolling. Ignoring the slight
coupling between the lateral and longitudinal channels, the longitudinal stick displacement does
not produce roll rate and, therefore, the de-p projection cannot be used to determine the post-failure
range of the roll rate. The adverse rolling can be compensated by a non-zero aileron trim deflection
ıaPF. Considering that the aileron deflection is positive when the left aileron is deflected downward
and the right one upward, such that it produces positive rolling moment as shown in Fig. 8.7, the
compensating aileron deflection can be approximated by using the balance of the rolling moment







if the locked stabilator is the left one, or







if the locked stabilator is the right one.
Figure 8.7: Sign Convention for Aileron De ections
The relationship between the aileron deflection and the lateral stick displacement is given by
da = kaıa, (8.19)
where ka is a constant and
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ıa = ıaL – ıaR. (8.20)
















ıamin = ıaLmin – ıaRmax and ıamax = ıaLmax – ıaRmin. (8.22)









depending on the sign of the stabilator failure, while maintaining the same span (i.e.,
damaxF – daminF = damax – damin).
Once the post-failure range of da is known, the da-p projection can be used to determine post-
failure range of p. Note that since C`ıeL = –C`ıeR , the aileron pseudo-failure range for the left
stabilator failure is the same as that of the right stabilator failure if the right stabilator is locked in
the opposite direction relative to the trim position.
8.3.2. Locked Aileron
In the case of a locked aileron failure, there is only one DIV:
Vı =
(
fıaLg for left aileron failure,
fıaRg for right aileron failure.
(8.23)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fdag and VE = fp, Ppg , (8.24)
respectively.
The lateral stick displacement is given by the relationship
da = kaıa, (8.25)
where ka is some constant and ıa is the differential aileron deflection given by
ıa = ıaL – ıaR. (8.26)































for right aileron failure,
(8.28)
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where ıaLF is the value at which the left aileron is locked and ıaRF is the value at which the right
aileron is locked. These values can be obtained from the outcome of the ACDQE.
Similar to the stabilator failure, the post-failure range of da in Eq. (8.28) is virtual since the
pilot is still capable of moving the stick to its extremities. Note that this range is the same if the









range of da is reduced after the failure).
It should be mentioned here that a locked aileron produces adverse yawing. However,
simulations have shown that this undesirable yawing is negligibly small and, therefore, it was
excluded from this analysis.
Once the post-failure range of da is known, the post-failure ranges for the ERVs may be found
from the corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
8.3.3. Locked Rudder
For a locked rudder, there is only one DIV:
Vı =
(
fırLg for left rudder failure,
fırRg for right rudder failure.
(8.29)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fdrg and VE = fr, Prg , (8.30)
respectively.
In the following analysis, the rudder deflection is considered positive when it is deflected to the
right of the pilot such that it produces positive yawing moment, as shown in Fig. 8.8.
Figure 8.8: Sign Convention for Rudder De ections (Top View)
The pedal displacement is given by the relationship
dr = krır, (8.31)




At normal flight conditions, the range of the pedal displacement is




























for right rudder failure,
(8.34)
where ırLF is the value at which the left rudder is locked and ırRF is the value at which the right
rudder is locked. These values can be obtained from the outcome of the ACDQE.
The post-failure range of dr in Eq. (8.34) is virtual since the pilot is still capable of moving








. Also note that, because of its collective
deflection, the locked rudder failure is similar to locked stabilator failure in many respects, if the
aircraft is equipped with dual rudder, as is the case of the F-15 aircraft.
It should bementioned here that a locked rudder produces adverse rolling. However, simulations
have shown that this undesirable rolling is negligibly small and, therefore, it was excluded from this
analysis.
Once the post-failure range of dr is known, the post-failure ranges for the ERVs may be found
from the corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
8.3.4. Locked Throttle
For a locked throttle failure, there is only one DIV:
Vı =
(
fıTLg for left throttle failure,
fıTRg for right throttle failure.
(8.35)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fdTg and VE = fax, az, r, H, Mg , (8.36)
respectively.
The throttle lever displacement is given by the relationship
dT = kTıT, (8.37)
















After failure, the range of dT becomes



















for right throttle failure,
(8.40)
where ıTLF is the value at which the left throttle is locked and ıTRF is the value at which the right
throttle is locked. These values can be obtained from the outcome of the ACDQE.
The post-failure range of dT in Eq. (8.40) is virtual since the pilot is still capable of moving the
throttle lever to its extremities. If the left and right throttle have identical ıT ranges under normal
conditions, then the post-failure range of the throttle lever displacement for the left throttle would













F, the post-failure ranges for ax, az, H, and M can be found from the
corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
The asymmetry induced by a locked throttle produces an adverse yawing (depending on the
distance between the engine and the centerline of the aircraft). Since the throttle lever displacement
does not produce yaw rate, therefore, the dT-r projection cannot be used to determine the post-failure
range of the yaw rate. The adverse yawing can be compensated by a shift of the trim position of
the rudder at ırPF. Considering the sign convention shown in Fig. 8.8, the compensating rudder
























if the locked throttle is the right one. Note that CnıTL > 0, CnıTR < 0, and Cnır < 0.




, the compensating rudder deflection for the left throttle failure


























, the compensating rudder deflection in the case of right












For full range of ıTL, the compensating rudder deflection for right throttle failure becomes










The relationship between the rudder deflection and the pedal displacement is given by
dr = krır, (8.47)





















2 and ırmax =
ırLmax + ırRmax
2 . (8.50)
Once the post-failure range of dr is known, the dr-r projection can be used to determine the post-









), depending on the sign of the locked throttle, while maintaining the same span
(i.e., drmaxF – drminF = drmax – drmin). To determine the direction in which the nominal range of
dr is shifted at post-failure, let’s consider the left throttle failure first. Substituting Eq. (8.41) into























Considering the full range of ıTR, the minimum value of drminF occurs at ıTR = 0 whereas drmaxF


























For the right throttle failure, substituting Eq. (8.42) into Eq. (8.49) gives the following minimum
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Considering the full range of ıTL, the minimum value of drminF in this case occurs at ıTL = 100 and






























F shifts towards positive deflections for a left throttle
failure and towards negative deflections for a right throttle failure.
8.3.5. Roll Rate Sensor Faults
For the roll rate sensor, the sets of DIVs, EDIVs, and ERVs are
Vı = fpmeasg , V" = fdag , and VE = fp, Ppg , (8.57)
respectively.
At normal flight conditions, the relationship between the reference roll rate and the lateral stick






Assuming error-free measurements, the measured roll rate is equal to the actual value, i.e.,
pmeas = pact, (8.59)
where pmeas is the measured roll rate and pact is the actual roll rate.






For a faulty roll rate sensor, the measured and commanded roll rates become
pmeas,F =
(
pact + pbias for pbias in the roll rate output,







pref – pact – pbias






for pconst roll rate output,
(8.62)
respectively.
Consequently, the faulty sensor produces an additional roll rate command given by
pcmd = pcmd,F – pcmd =
(
–pbias for pbias in the roll rate output,
pref – pconst for pconst roll rate output.
(8.63)
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Note that the sign of the resulting roll of the aircraft would be opposite to that of the bias or constant
output of the sensor. This undesirable effect can be eliminated by deflecting the aileron by a certain













for pconst roll rate output.
(8.64)





damin – daF, damax – daF

. (8.65)
Using this post-failure range of da, the post-failure ranges for all the ERVs can be obtained from
the corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
8.3.6. Pitch Rate Sensor Faults
For the pitch rate sensor, the sets of DIVs, EDIVs, and ERVs are
Vı = fqmeasg , V" = fdeg , and VE = fq, Pqg , (8.66)
respectively.
At normal flight conditions, the relationship between the reference pitch rate and the






Assuming error-free measurements, the measured pitch rate is equal to the actual value, i.e.,
qmeas = qact, (8.68)
where qmeas is the measured pitch rate and qact is the actual pitch rate.






For a faulty pitch rate sensor, the measured and commanded pitch rates become
qmeas,F =
(
qact + qbias for qbias in the pitch rate output,







qref – qact – qbias






for qconst pitch rate output,
(8.71)
respectively.
Consequently, the faulty sensor produces an additional pitch rate command given by
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qcmd = qcmd,F – qcmd =
(
–qbias for qbias in the pitch rate output,
qref – qconst for qconst pitch rate output.
(8.72)
Note that the sign of the resulting pitch of the aircraft is opposite to that of the bias or constant
output of the sensor. This undesirable effect can be eliminated by deflecting the elevator by a
certain amount which will, eventually, restrict the excursion of the longitudinal stick displacement












for qconst pitch rate output.
(8.73)





demin – deF, demax – deF

. (8.74)
Using this post-failure range of de, the post-failure ranges for all the ERVs can be obtained from
the corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
8.3.7. Yaw Rate Sensor Faults
For the yaw rate sensor, the sets of DIVs, EDIVs, and ERVs are
Vı = frmeasg , V" = fdrg , and VE = fr, Pr, ˇg , (8.75)
respectively.
At normal flight conditions, the relationship between the reference yaw rate and the pedal






Assuming error-free measurements, the measured yaw rate is equal to the actual value, i.e.,
rmeas = ract, (8.77)
where rmeas is the measured yaw rate and ract is the actual yaw rate.






For a faulty yaw rate sensor, the measured and commanded yaw rates become
rmeas,F =
(
ract + rbias for rbias in the yaw rate output,







rref – ract – rbias






for rconst yaw rate output,
(8.80)
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respectively.
Consequently, the faulty sensor produces an additional yaw rate command given by
rcmd = rcmd,F – rcmd =
(
–rbias for bias in the yaw rate of rbias,
rref – rconst for rconst yaw rate output.
(8.81)
Note that the sign of the resulting yaw of the aircraft is opposite to that of the bias or constant
output of the sensor. This undesirable effect can be eliminated by deflecting the rudder by a certain













for rconst yaw rate output.
(8.82)





drmin – drF, drmax – drF

. (8.83)
Using this post-failure range of dr, the post-failure ranges for all the ERVs can be obtained from
the corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
8.3.8. Wing Damage
For a damaged wing, the set of DIVs consists of two variables:
Vı = fCLWL, CmWLg , (8.84)
where CLWL is the change in the lift moment and CmWL is the change in the pitching moment.
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fda, de, dr, dTg , (8.85)
and
VE = fH, M, p, q, Pp, Pqg , (8.86)
respectively.
Referring to Fig. 8.9, the aircraft is under equilibrium when it is flying at normal conditions,
i.e., X
Fx = 0 : T + L sin˛ – D cos˛ – G sin  = 0, (8.87a)
X
Fz = 0 : –L cos˛ – D sin˛ + G cos  = 0, (8.87b)
X
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C`WF = 0. (8.87e)
Figure 8.9: Aircraft Aerodynamic Forces
A damaged wing produces changes on the variables involved in the above equations. To

















































C`WF = –CLWL ÀL = –CLWR ÀR ¤ 0, (8.88e)
where ÀL is the distance to the plane of symmetry of the aerodynamic center of the left damaged
wing and ÀR is the distance to the plane of symmetry of the aerodynamic center of the right damaged
wing. Note that ÀL < 0, while ÀR > 0.
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A rollingmoment is needed to compensate the non-zero rollingmoment in Eq. (8.88e). This can
be achieved from an aileron deflection, which will apparently reduces the authority of the aileron
command. Similar analysis to the aileron pseudo-failure of the stabilator failure can be carried out
here. The compensating aileron deflection can be approximated using the balance of the rolling
moment




where b is the wingspan and "a is an alteration factor which counts for how the left aileron is affected
by the wing failure such that
"a =
(
0.5 if the aileron is completely out of work,
1 if the aileron is not affected by the wing damage.
(8.90)
The post-failure range of the lateral stick displacement is given by Eq. (8.21). Note that, in this
case, the direction of the shift the post-failure range depends on the failed wing side and the sign
of the lift alteration. However, it is reasonable to assume thatCLWL > 0 since the wing damage is




F can be used to determine the post-failure ranges
of p and Pp from the corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
Wing damage causes a reduction in the longitudinal control authority as well. Considering the
pitching moment balance
MWF = –MHT, (8.91)
and


















with which the post-failure ranges for q and Pq can be obtained from the corresponding 2-D
projections of the self.
To determine post failure-ranges for H and M, consider the following equations for the
































cos˛ sin˛ + G cos  cos – G sin  sin = 0, (8.94b)
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In order to keep the same trajectory slope  , we have to ensure that ˛ =  . Recalling that L




is known, then we end up with three equations and three unknowns,





at post-failure and, hence, the post-failure ranges for M and H from the corresponding
2-D projections of the self.
8.3.9. Horizontal Tail Damage
In this case, the DIV is
Vı =
(
fCLHLg for left horizontal tail failure,
fCLHRg for right horizontal tail failure.
(8.95)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fda, deg , (8.96)
and
VE = fH, M, p, q, Pp, Pqg , (8.97)
respectively.
In this analysis, it is assumed that the stabilator corresponding to the damaged side of the
horizontal tail can be still deflected; however, the respective control derivative may be affected,
such that
CLHL = CLHL0 +CLıeıe, (8.98)
for left horizontal tail and
CLHR = CLHR0 +CLıeıe, (8.99)
for right horizontal tail.
To represent the reduction of the damaged horizontal tail capability in producing lift, the
alterations CLHL0 , CLHR0 , and CLıe are assumed negative. The additional elevator deflection












With d denoting the damage factor (0  d  1) which can be obtained from the outcome of the





















= dCLıeıe2 , (8.101)
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where ıe is given by Eq. (8.14).
Substituting Eq. (8.101) into Eq. (8.100) and simplifying, we have
ıe = –
d
2 – d ıe. (8.102)





demin – keıe, demax – keıe

. (8.103)
With this range, the post-failure ranges for H,M, q and Pq can now be found from the corresponding
2-D projections of the self.
Aileron deflection can be used to compensate for the rolling moment produced by the damaged








where b is the wing span and `LHT < 0 is the distance from the left horizontal tail aerodynamic
center to the plane of symmetry, which can be estimated from the following moment balance:
C`ıa





























damin – kaıa, damax – kaıa

, (8.108)
with which the post-failure ranges for p and Pp can now be found from the corresponding 2-D
projections of the self.
8.3.10. Vertical Tail Damage
For a damaged vertical tail, the DIV is
Vı =
(
fCYVLg for left vertical tail failure,
fCYVRg for right vertical tail failure.
(8.109)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fda, drg , and VE = fp, r, Pp, Prg , (8.110)
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respectively.
In this analysis, it is assumed that the rudder corresponding to the damaged side of the vertical
tail can be still deflected; however, the respective control derivative may be affected, such that
CYVL = CYVL0 +CYırır, (8.111)
for left vertical tail and
CYVR = CYVR0 +CYırır, (8.112)
for right vertical tail.
The additional rudder deflection necessary to compensate for the reduction in lift can be found

















drmin – krır, drmax – krır

. (8.114)
With this range, the post-failure ranges for r and Pr can now be found from the corresponding 2-D
projections of the self.
Aileron deflection can be used to compensate for the rolling moment produced by the damaged








where b is the wing span and hVT < 0 is the distance from the vertical tail aerodynamic center to
the body horizontal plane.





damin – kaıa, damax – kaıa

, (8.116)
with which the post-failure ranges for p and Pp can now be found from the corresponding 2-D
projections of the self.
8.3.11. Engine Reduced Ef ciency
In the case of engine failure, there is only one DIV:
Vı =
(
fTLg for left engine failure,
fTRg for right engine failure.
(8.117)
The sets of EDIVs and ERVs are
V" = fdTg and VE = fax, az, r, H, Mg , (8.118)
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respectively.


























































for right engine failure,
(8.121)
where TLminF, TLmaxF, TRminF, and TRmaxF are values that can be obtained from the outcome of the
ACDQE.
The post-failure range of dT in Eq. (8.121) is virtual since the pilot is still capable of moving
the throttle lever to its extremities. If the left and right engine have identical thrust ranges under
normal conditions, then the post-failure range of the throttle lever displacement for the left engine













F, the post-failure ranges for ax, az, H, and M can be found from the
corresponding 2-D projections of the self.
The asymmetry induced by an engine failure produces an adverse yawing (depending on the
distance between the engine and the centerline of the aircraft). Since the throttle lever displacement
does not produce yaw rate, therefore, the dT-r projection cannot be used to determine the post-failure
range of the yaw rate. The adverse yawing can be compensated by a rudder deflection ırPF in a
similar manner to that of the locked throttle case. However, in the case of engine failure, the pseudo-
failure of the rudder consists of a locked rudder at variable deflection, depending on dT. Assuming
the total thrust and the throttle deflection vary linearly with the throttle lever displacement, the total
yawing moment can be approximated as




dT = 0, (8.122)
at normal operating conditions.
If the efficiency of the left engine is reduced, then Eq. (8.122) becomes 
CnıTLF + CnıTR

dT ¤ 0. (8.123)
Let `eL be the distance from the aircraft center of gravity to the axis of the left engine and let `eR be
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where  is the air density, s is the surface area of the wing, and b is the wing span. Since
CnıTRdT = `eLTR
2 sbV 2












Similar derivation can be carried out for the right engine failure. The compensating rudder
deflection can be obtained from the balance of the yawing moment 
CnıTLF + CnıTR





if the left engine experiences a reduction in efficiency or from 
CnıTL + CnıTRF





if the right engine experiences a reduction in efficiency. In either case, the post-failure range of the

















2 and ırmax =
ırLmax + ırRmax
2 . (8.130)




F varies with the dT in
this case. Once the post-failure range of dr is known, the dr-r projection can be used to determine





9.1. Generation of the Self and Nonself. .
Features data were collected from experimental flight tests of a fighter research aircraft performed
on the WVU motion-based flight simulator in two sets: development tests and validation tests.
Eleven flight tests under nominal conditions covering a wide range of the flight envelope, as shown
in Fig. 4.5, were used as development tests to generate the self and nonself using the RDSUM and
CSUM presented in Chapter 5. Both methods were implemented in MATLAB® to output a set
of 496 two-dimensional subselves (projections) from unique combinations of the aircraft features
listed in Table 5.1. Figure 9.1 depicts sample 2-dimensional subself clusters along with the AIS
antibodies (nonself) generated for a subself defined by the non-dimensional roll rate neural network
output feature NNp and the reference roll rate pref using the RDSUM. An example of the clusters
and antibodies generated with the CSUM is presented in Fig. 9.2 for the same subself.
Figure 9.1: Sample 2-D Subself Clusters with AIS Antibodies Generated Using RDSUM
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Figure 9.2: Sample 2-D Subself Clusters with AIS Antibodies Generated Using CSUM
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 illustrate the reduction of the subself clusters with the CSUM. Figure 9.3
shows the union of different sets of clusters generated from 11 single simulator test data before
applying the fusion process. The union set has a total of 22,000 clusters. Figure 9.4 shows the
reduced set of 6,343 clusters after the complete fusion process. This shows capability of the
fusion algorithm of reducing the number of clusters to approximately one third with an acceptable
overlapping among them. The allowed overlap value has to be selected in such a way that the
balance between the holes and the covered space is adequate.
Validation tests were used to analyze and compare the performance of the detectors generated
with both RDSUM and CSUM in terms of detection rates (DR) and false alarms (FA). Figure 9.5
shows a typical 2-dimensional subself with validation test points for a nominal flight test.
Validation test points for a flight test under abnormal conditions are shown in Fig. 9.6 using the
same subself. Assuming typical binary outcomes, the results of the detection based on the
self/nonself discrimination for each feature point can be categorized as
• True Positives, TP: the number of abnormal data points detected as abnormal.
• True Negatives, TN: the number of normal data points not detected as abnormal.
• False Positives, FP: the number of normal data points detected as abnormal.
• False Negatives, FN: the number of abnormal data points not detected as abnormal.
The detection rate, DR, is defined as the ratio of true positives to the total amount of abnormal
data points, i.e.,
DR = TP
TP + FN  100. (9.1)
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Figure 9.3: A 2-D Subself with 22,000 Clusters Figure 9.4: A 2-D Subself with 6,343 Clusters
Figure 9.5: pref-NNp Projection with Nominal
Flight Test Data Points
Figure 9.6: pref-NNp Projection with Failure Flight
Test Data Points
The false alarm rate, FA, is defined as the ratio of false positives to the total amount of normal
data points, i.e.,
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FA = FP
TN + FP  100. (9.2)
Listed in Table 9.1 are selected subselves among the 496 two-dimensional subselves along with
their corresponding features.
Table 9.1: Features of Selected 2-Dimensional Subselves
Subself # Features Subself # Features
1 pref, NNp 85 NNp, OQEE
30 qref, NNp 86 NNp, DQEEp
42 qref, q 87 NNp, DQEEq
53 qref, dr 89 NNp, V
82 NNp, NNq 90 NNp, ˛
83 NNp, NNr 92 NNp, p
84 NNp, MQEE 93 NNp, q
94 NNp, r 105 NNp, dT
95 NNp,  106 NNp, M
96 NNp,  224 DQEEq,  
97 NNp,  233 DQEEq, dr
98 NNp, H 410 NNp, Pp
99 NNp, ax 441 NNp, Pq
100 NNp, ay 471 NNp, Pr
Table 9.2 provides a comparison between the detection performance of these subselves
generated with RDSUM and the detection performance of the same subselves generated with
CSUM under four different failures: left aileron locked at 2.5ı, left stabilator locked at 2ı, 6% loss
of the left wing, and 5ı bias in the pitch rate sensor output. The number of data points in each of
these tests was about 60,000.











RDSUM CSUM RDSUM CSUM RDSUM CSUM RDSUM CSUM
DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA
3 81.2 0.0 82.0 1.0 99.3 0.0 99.3 1.85 98.8 0.0 99.0 1.1 0.08 0.0 2.27 1.0
30 82.1 0.0 83.5 0.0 99.2 0.0 99.2 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.5 0.0 2.96 0.0 4.16 0.0
42 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.33 0.0 8.22 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.1 0.0 99.9 0.0 99.9 0.0
53 16.0 0.0 22.9 0.0 23.1 0.0 24.8 0.0 20.8 0.0 25.1 0.0 85.6 0.0 86.7 0.0
82 90.2 0.0 92.3 0.0 99.7 0.0 99.7 0.0 99.1 0.0 99.2 0.0 3.87 0.0 4.63 0.0
83 86.3 0.0 88.1 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.6 0.0 98.8 0.0 99.0 0.0 0.08 0.0 0.22 0.0
84 85.7 0.0 86.2 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 98.9 0.0 99.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.05 0.0
85 85.4 0.0 88.7 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.4 0.0 98.9 0.0 98.9 0.0 25.1 0.0 26.5 0.0
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RDSUM CSUM RDSUM CSUM RDSUM CSUM RDSUM CSUM
DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA DR FA
86 89.8 0.0 84.2 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.4 0.0 98.9 0.0 98.9 0.0 23.2 0.0 24.2 0.0
87 79.9 0.0 80.4 0.0 99.3 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.0 0.0 99.1 0.0 41.6 0.0 46.8 0.0
89 89.5 0.0 90.0 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.1 0.0 99.2 0.0 1.37 0.0 1.46 0.0
90 90.9 0.0 91.1 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 0.28 0.0 0.68 0.0
92 81.3 0.0 80.8 0.0 99.3 0.0 99.3 0.0 99.0 0.0 99.0 0.0 0.06 0.0 0.09 0.0
93 81.5 0.0 82.9 1.25 99.4 0.0 99.4 1.55 99.3 0.0 99.4 0.0 0.48 0.0 1.3 0.0
94 85.1 0.0 85.8 2.25 99.4 0.0 99.5 2.25 98.9 0.0 99.0 2.4 0.00 0.0 0.51 2.25
95 91.0 0.0 90.9 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.1 0.0 99.1 0.0 0.23 0.0 0.87 0.0
96 89.0 0.0 89.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.2 0.0 99.3 0.0 2.33 0.0 3.18 0.0
97 61.1 0.0 86.3 0.0 50.2 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.0 0.0 99.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.08 0.0
98 93.2 0.0 94.6 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.1 0.0 99.2 0.0 10.0 0.0 11.2 0.0
99 85.1 0.0 86.0 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.1 0.0 99.2 0.0 2.59 0.0 2.98 0.0
100 86.2 0.0 86.9 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.0 0.0 99.0 0.0 97.7 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.16 0.0
105 90.4 0.0 91.1 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.6 0.0 98.9 0.0 99.0 0.0 6.26 0.0 12.2 0.0
106 92.7 0.0 93.1 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 99.0 0.0 99.1 0.0 6.31 0.0 6.76 0.0
224 0.0 0.0 0.36 0.0 1.26 0.0 1.85 0.0 0.66 0.0 0.9 0.0 60.2 0.0 63.7 0.0
233 4.03 0.0 5.51 0.0 6.06 0.0 8.04 0.0 10.3 0.0 12.4 0.0 85.7 0.0 87.8 0.0
410 91.5 0.0 81.4 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.3 0.0 99.1 0.0 3.23 0.0 0.06 0.0
441 85.0 0.0 80.9 0.0 99.6 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.1 0.0 2.88 0.0 0.64 0.0
471 83.1 0.0 80.5 0.0 99.4 0.0 99.3 0.0 99.0 0.0 98.9 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.05 0.0
These results show that different selves favor the detection of the same particular types of failures
for both RDSUM and CSUM methodologies. For instance, selves #82, #96, and #410, among
others, show poor detection capabilities for the sensor failure, but an acceptable one for actuator
and structural failures with low false alarms. On the other hand, selves #42, #53, and #233 present
good performance for sensor failure but low detection rate for the other three abnormal conditions.
Note that every self-case presents acceptable performance for at least one of the failures considered.
The fact that different selves favor the detection of particular types of failures has been used by [79].
to develop an integrated scheme where different self configurations ensure overall high detection
rate and low number of false alarms. The mentioned mechanism uses lower order projections to
build subselves instead of using one single higher dimensional hyper-space and makes use of a
specific hierarchy of feature relevance with respect to each type of failure.
Figures 9.7 through 9.10 present a direct comparison between the two methodologies,
RDSUM and CSUM, for the four aforementioned abnormal conditions for some of the selves
outlined in Table 9.1. For left aileron failure, as shown in Fig. 9.7, the CSUM performed slightly
better with respect to RDSUM for most of the selves. The same characteristic is present in the
other three failures as shown in Figs. 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10. Figure 9.11 shows a comparison between
the two methodologies for one single self (self #87) where both RDSUM and CSUM have almost
the same performance pattern with acceptable detection rate for all the failures except the
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abnormal condition of the pitch rate sensor. This consistent trend has been noticed for all other
subselves/projections. In general, the percentage detection rate and false alarms remain around
the same values for both methodologies without significant differences. This fact allows
concluding that, in terms of detection performance, both RDSUM and CSUM are equivalent.
Figure 9.7: Performance Comparison Between
RDSUM and CSUM for Left Aileron Locked at 2.5°
Figure 9.8: Performance Comparison Between
RDSUM and CSUM for Left Stabilator Locked at 2°
Figure 9.9: Performance Comparison Between
RDSUM and CSUM for 6% Loss of the Left Wing
Figure 9.10: Performance Comparison Between
RDSUM and CSUM for 5° Bias in the Pitch Rate
Sensor
Figure 9.11: Performance Comparison for Different Abnormal Conditions Using Self #87
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The computational time needed by RDSUM is consistently less than the one needed by CSUM.
The difference varies quite largely depending on the self. The fewer the number of distinct data,
the less the computational time RDSUM needs for clustering. Typically, the size of the raw data
file is reduced significantly after eliminating duplicate points. The clustering module is invoked
only one time per self for RDSUM. The CSUM clusters the same number of flight data points 11
times (the number of nominal flight tests used) without any duplicate point removal. Only then,
duplicate clusters are eliminated. For some of the selves generated using RDSUM, the number of
unique data was around 60,000 (which is comparable to the number of records in each of the 11
flight files).
The values of the computational times for the two proposed detector generation methods are
presented in Table 9.3 for several different selves. It should be noted that the single file including
all flight data used for detector generation with RDSUM has about 600,000 records. In most cases,
this results in a still large data set even after duplicates are eliminated, which cannot be handled by
the k-means clustering algorithm on computers with less than 8GB RAM.
Table 9.3: Computational Time Comparison Between the Two Detector Generation Methods
Computer Specifications Intel® CoreTM i7 @ 3.33GHz, 12GB RAM
Operating System Windows® XP Professional 64-bit
Development Environment MATLAB® 2009b
Generation Method RDSUM CSUM
Computational Time [sec]
for Detector Generation
Self #3 700 6020
Self #30 1120 5589
Self #42 801 9032
Self #53 266 2190
Self #82 4404 4857
Self #90 1126 4521
Self #92 1425 3030
Self #93 2134 2653
Self #94 2507 2703
Self #95 4217 9527
Self #96 1903 2277
Self #97 3797 11315
Self #98 1900 2342
Self #99 1276 2443
Self #105 2056 2245
Self #106 2283 2285
Self #224 1562 2623
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9.2. AC Detection Using the Arti cial DC Mechanism. .
The artificial DC mechanism for detection proposed in Chapter 6 was implemented in C# for
computational speed considerations. The code was compiled with Microsoft® .NETTM Framework
version 4.5 and integrated with the WVU simulation environment for the fighter aircraft.
Validation tests, along with the information of the generated subselves, were used as input data to
the DC algorithm. The algorithm was initialized with a pool of 100 DCs and a moving time
window of 50 time steps (i.e., 1 s).
The sum of the residual cytotoxic T-cells
PN
i=1 eKi in Eq. 6.14 versus time is shown in Figs. 9.12
to 9.15 for different tests. These figures show that the sum of the residual cytotoxic T-cells produced
by the DCmechanism is negative and remains in a narrow band for normal conditions. When an AC
occurs, this parameter experiences an abrupt increase and remains positive, as expected, capturing
the occurrence of the failure and providing a reliable detection criterion.
Figure 9.12: Sum of Residual Cytotoxic T-cells vs.
Time of a Nominal Flight Test
Figure 9.13: Sum of Residual Cytotoxic T-cells vs.
Time of an AC Flight Test: Right Aileron Locked at
8°. Actual Failure Time = 40 s; Detection Time =
40.76 s
Figure 9.14: Sum of Residual Cytotoxic T-cells vs.
Time of an AC Flight Test: 3° LFDB in Yaw Rate
Sensor. Actual Failure Time = 40 s; Detection Time =
43.38 s
Figure 9.15: Sum of Residual Cytotoxic T-cells vs.
Time of an AC Flight Test: 15% Loss of the Left
Wing. Actual Failure Time = 40 s; Detection Time =
40.52 s
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Table 9.4 summarizes the detection rate for different subsystems. The percentage detection rate
is computed based on the ratio between the number of samples detected as AC and total number
of samples under AC. Note that these rates are the averages of detection rates of the corresponding
number of different tests with different failure magnitudes and/or flight paths in the third column of
the table. Also note that each flight test lasts for about 20 min. on average and that all failures were
introduced at 40 s. Failures can be introduced at any time during the flight test without affecting the
performance of the algorithm. Samples during the first 40 s were used to determine the false alarm
rate as the ratio between the number of samples detected as failure and the total number of samples
under normal conditions. In all tests, the false alarm rate was zero. Without specific tuning of the
parameters, the average detection time of the algorithm for the failures considered was 2 s, with a
standard deviation of 2.8 s.
Table 9.4: Average Detection Rate for Different Subsystems
k Subsystem Detection Rate, % No. Tests
1 Left Stabilator 99.93 3
2 Right Stabilator 99.93 3
3 Left Aileron 99.46 4
4 Right Aileron 98.94 3
5 Left Rudder 93.09 3
6 Right Rudder 80.47 2
7 Left Throttle 54.76 2
8 Right Throttle 54.72 2
9 Left Wing 99.93 4
10 Right Wing 99.94 4
11 Left Horizontal Tail 99.82 2
12 Right Horizontal Tail 99.91 2
13 Left Vertical Tail 80.30 2
14 Right Vertical Tail 83.84 2
15 Roll Rate Sensor 96.46 6
16 Pitch Rate Sensor 99.86 5
17 Yaw Rate Sensor 99.78 5
18 Left Engine 59.72 4
19 Right Engine 59.22 4
The lower average detection rate for the cases of locked right rudder and missing vertical tail
can be attributed to imperfections in the self/nonself generation in regions relevant to directional
channel maneuvers and to the specific shape of the high-dimensional self, which prevents some
of the projections from capturing the dynamic fingerprint of the failure. It is expected that the
inclusion of higher-dimensional projections would eliminate or mitigate this effect.
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9.3. AC Identi cation Using the Arti cial DC Mechanism. .
Among the three pattern approaches proposed in Chapter 7, the features-pattern approach was
selected since it requires less computational resources as compared to the projections-pattern and
matrix-pattern approaches. The artificial DC mechanism for identification with the features-
pattern approach was implemented in C#. The naïve Bayes classifier, discussed in Sec. 7.4, was
trained with the current features-pattern vectors F1' from a set of training failure tests for each
subsystem k to implicitly define the reference features-pattern FPk of that subsystem in terms of
the corresponding mean vector and covariance matrix. Figure 9.16 illustrates the variation of the
current features-pattern vectors F1' over the entire test time of a failed right wing subsystem
(k = 13) in one of these tests. Figures 9.17 to 9.35 depict the reference FPk vectors of the failed
subsystems presented in Table 4.1. Once a failure is declared by the DC mechanism in a
validation test, the current F1' vector is passed to the naïve Bayes classifier to select the closest
FPk to the current F1' vector, and thus identify the failed subsystem. A sample current F1' is
shown in Fig. 9.36 for a validation failure test with right wing damage.
Figure 9.16: Variation of the Feature-Pattern Vector with
Time for a Failed Right Wing Subsystem
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Figure 9.17: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Stabilator
Figure 9.18: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Stabilator
Figure 9.19: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Aileron
Figure 9.20: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Aileron
Figure 9.21: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Rudder
Figure 9.22: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Rudder
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Figure 9.23: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Throttle
Figure 9.24: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Throttle
Figure 9.25: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Wing
Figure 9.26: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Wing
Figure 9.27: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Horizontal Tail
Figure 9.28: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Horizontal Tail
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Figure 9.29: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Vertical Tail
Figure 9.30: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Vertical Tail
Figure 9.31: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Roll Rate Sensor
Figure 9.32: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Pitch Rate Sensor
Figure 9.33: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Yaw Rate Sensor
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Figure 9.34: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Left Engine
Figure 9.35: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Failed Right Engine
Figure 9.36: Sample Current Feature-Pattern for a Failed Right Wing
Listed in Table 9.5 are the average identification rates for different subsystems. Note that the
same number of tests shown in Table 9.4 was also used here. These results show the capability of the
proposed AC identification scheme in isolating the failed subsystem with very high identification
rates. Note that the first column in Table 9.5 represents the subsystem affected by the failure and
the first row represents the subsystem identified as the failed one. The off-diagonal numbers in
the table represent the incorrect identification (misclassification) rates. For example, 99.13% of
the samples under failure of the right stabilator were correctly identified, whereas for 0.81% of
these samples, the failed subsystem was incorrectly identified as the left stabilator; for 0.05% of
these samples, the failed subsystem was incorrectly identified as the left rudder; and for 0.01% of
these samples, the failed subsystem was incorrectly identified as the pitch rate sensor. The small
variations in performance between subsystems may be typically attributed to imperfect coverage of
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the self, imperfect detector generation, errors introduced by the projections, and variations of the
classification algorithm used in conjunction with the DC mechanism.



































































































































































































































































































9.4. AC Qualitative Evaluation. .
The features-pattern approach was also used to implement the ACQE scheme proposed in Sec. 8.1.
The naïve Bayes classifier was trained using a set of training failure tests to define the reference
features-patternFPACj for each failure typeACj. Figures 9.37 to 9.42 illustrate the reference features-
patterns for the actuators subsystems. Note that the ACQE scheme was tested for these subsystems
only since other subsystems were simulated with only one type of failure (see Table 4.1).
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Figure 9.37: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Stabilator Under Failure Type 1
Figure 9.38: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Stabilator Under Failure Type 2
Figure 9.39: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Aileron Under Failure Type 1
Figure 9.40: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Aileron Under Failure Type 2
Figure 9.41: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Rudder Under Failure Type 1
Figure 9.42: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Rudder Under Failure Type 2
Table 9.6 lists the ACQE rates for the actuator subsystems. The ACQE rate is defined as the
number of time steps for which the failure type is correctly evaluated divided by the total number
of time steps after failure. The second column in Table 9.6 represents the “known” failure type of
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the corresponding subsystem whereas the first row represents the evaluated failure. For example,
99.98% of the failure samples for failure type 1 of the stabilator was correctly evaluated as failure
type 1 while for 0.02% of these samples was incorrectly evaluated as failure type 2. These results
show the capability of the proposed ACQE scheme in isolating the failure type with very high rates.
Table 9.6: ACQE Rates for the Actuator Subsystems
.
.Subsystem .Failure Type .1 .2
. .1 .99.98 .0.02
. .2 .0.01 .99.99
. .1 .99.99 .0.01
. .2 .0.01 .99.99
. .1 .100.00 .0.00




9.5. AC Direct Quantitative Evaluation. .
The features-pattern approach was also used to implement the ACQE scheme proposed in Sec. 8.2.
The naïve Bayes classifier was trained using a set of training failure tests to define the reference
features-patternFPfs for each failure severity fs. Figures 9.43 to 9.68 illustrate the reference features-
patterns for subsystems under different failure severity scales.
Figure 9.43: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Stabilator Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.44: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Stabilator Under Medium Severity Failure
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Figure 9.45: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Stabilator Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.46: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Aileron Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.47: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Aileron Under Medium Severity Failure
Figure 9.48: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Aileron Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.49: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Rudder Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.50: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Rudder Under Medium Severity Failure
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Figure 9.51: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Rudder Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.52: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Wing Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.53: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Wing Under Medium Severity Failure
Figure 9.54: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Wing Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.55: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Horizontal Tail Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.56: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Horizontal Tail Under Medium Severity Failure
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Figure 9.57: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Horizontal Tail Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.58: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Vertical Tail Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.59: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Vertical Tail Under Medium Severity Failure
Figure 9.60: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Vertical Tail Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.61: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Roll Rate Sensor Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.62: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Roll Rate Sensor Under High Severity Failure
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Figure 9.63: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Pitch Rate Sensor Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.64: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Pitch Rate Sensor Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.65: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Yaw Rate Sensor Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.66: Reference Features-Pattern for a
Yaw Rate Sensor Under High Severity Failure
Figure 9.67: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Engine Under Low Severity Failure
Figure 9.68: Reference Features-Pattern for an
Engine Under High Severity Failure
Table 9.7 presents the ACDQE rates for the actuator and structural subsystems. The ACDQE
rate is defined as the number of time steps for which the failure severity is correctly evaluated
divided by the total number of time steps after failure. The second column in this table represents
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the “known” failure severity of the corresponding subsystem, whereas the first row represents the
evaluated failure severity. Note that only “low” and “high” severity scales were simulated for the
sensors and engine failures. These results show the capability of the proposed ACDQE scheme in
isolating the failure severity with very high rates.












. .Low .98.72 .1.28 .0.00
.Stabilator .Medium .0.04 .99.96 .0.00
. .High .0.05 .0.00 .99.95
. .Low .100.00 .0.00 .0.00
.Aileron .Medium .3.10 .95.47 .1.43
. .High .0.11 .0.00 .99.89
. .Low .100.00 .0.00 .0.00
.Rudder .Medium .0.01 .99.99 .0.00
. .High .0.00 .0.00 .100.00
. .Low .100.00 .0.00 .0.00
.Wing .Medium .0.01 .99.99 .0.00
. .High .0.06 .0.00 .99.94
. .Low .100.00 .0.00 .0.00
.Horizontal Tail .Medium .0.00 .99.99 .0.01
. .High .0.01 .0.00 .99.99
. .Low .100.00 .0.00 .0.00
.Vertical Tail .Medium .0.01 .99.99 .0.00
. .High .0.00 .0.00 .100.00
.Roll Rate .Low .99.99 .— .0.01
.Sensor .High .0.00 .— .100.00
.Pitch Rate .Low .100.00 .— .0.00
.Sensor .High .0.00 .— .100.00
.Yaw Rate .Low .100.00 .— .0.00
.Sensor .High .0.01 .— .99.99
. .Low .100.00 .— .0.00
. .High .0.00 .— .100.00
Engine
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9.6. AC Indirect Quantitative Evaluation. .
To achieve desirable performance of the post-failure envelope prediction methodology presented in
Sec. 8.3, data points acquired through properly designed validation tests under abnormal conditions
must stay within the predicted range and be close to the predicted limits. Therefore, for performance
evaluation of these schemes, three metrics have been defined attempting to capture the level of
prediction confidence, the level of possible range exceedance, and the level of predicted range
conservativeness. The first evaluation criterion is expressed by a prediction rate, PR, calculated as
the percentage of all validation points that fall inside the predicted range. If NR is the number of
the points inside the predicted range and NR is the number of points outside the that range, then the
total number of validation points is given by
NV = NR + NR. (9.3)




The level of possible range exceedance is assessed as the relative maximum amount by which points

















Obviously, it is desirable to have large values of PR and low values of REI. However, it should be
noted that, if the predicted range is exceedingly/unrealistically large, then PR = 100% and
REI = 0% without representing good performance. Therefore, the values of these two evaluation
metrics must be considered in conjunction with a margin index, MI, that is expected to capture the
















It should be also noted that, if the validation test does not cover the nominal range of the tests used
for self generation, then high values ofMI do not necessarily indicate a flaw in the post-failure range
prediction.
Table 9.8 presents the predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under a stabilator failure
along with the corresponding nominal ranges and the performance metrics defined above.
Figure 9.69 shows an example of a 2-D projection with the validation test points and the
corresponding predicted post-failure ranges represented by the vertical and horizontal lines. The
failure considered consists of left stabilator locked at 8°. Two different validation tests have been
performed covering the altitude range of the nominal tests for Mach between 0.7 and 0.9. The
results show alterations of the ranges of pitch rate, pitch acceleration, and roll rate as expected.
Note that the reduced range of Mach and altitude considered when building the self is not affected
by this stabilator failure. The verification points are well within predicted ranges for all variables
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considered. Only very few points exceed the predicted ranges by small relative amounts, as
captured by REI, except for pitch acceleration. The variation of this variable experiences a sudden
peak at the failure occurrence moment. The duration of the peak is very short as shown by the
values of the pitch rate, which remain practically within predicted range. The low values of MI
show that the predicted limits of the respective variables are not unrealistically large. It should be
noted that the large MI value recorded for Mach number is due to the fact that the verification tests
do not cover the range between 0.5 and 0.7, which was included in the self. This is one example
of a situation when large values of MI reflect the incompleteness of the verification tests rather
than flaws in the range prediction process.
Table 9.8: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Stabilator Failure




































Figure 9.69: Post-Failure Range of the Pitch Rate Under Stabilator Failure
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The predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under the aileron failure are presented in
Table 9.9. Corresponding nominal ranges and values of the three performance metrics are
included. The failure consists of a right aileron locked at 8°. Two different verification tests have
been performed covering an altitude range between 2,000 m and 10,000 m and a Mach number
ranges between 0.7 and 0.9. The results show alterations of the ranges of roll rate and roll
acceleration, as expected. The verification points are all within predicted ranges for both variables
considered with only insignificant exceedance as indicated by REI. The low values of REI and MI
indicate that the predicted ranges are not unrealistically large.
Table 9.9: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Aileron Failure















The predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under the rudder failure are presented in
Table 9.10. The failure consists of a right rudder locked at 8°. Two different verification tests have
been performed covering the altitude and Mach ranges of the nominal tests. The results show
alterations of the ranges of yaw rate and yaw acceleration, as expected. The verification points are
all within predicted ranges for both variables considered. The relatively low values of MI lead to
the conclusion that the predicted limits of the respective variables are not unrealistically large.
Table 9.10: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Rudder Failure















The predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under a wing damage affecting 15% of the left
surface are listed in Table 9.11. Two verification tests have been performed covering the altitude
and Mach number ranges of the nominal tests. The results show alterations of the ranges of pitch
rate, pitch acceleration, roll rate, and roll acceleration, as expected. Note that the reduced range of
Mach and altitude considered when building the self is not affected by this failure. The verification
points are well within the predicted ranges for all variables considered. Only very few points exceed
the predicted ranges by small relative amounts, as captured by REI. The relatively low values of
MI lead to the conclusion that the predicted limits of the respective variables are not unrealistically
large.
Table 9.12 presents the predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under a horizontal tail
damage affecting 60% of the left surface. One verification test has been performed covering an
altitude range between 6,000 m and 10,000 m and a Mach number range between 0.7 and 0.9. The
results show alterations of the ranges of pitch rate, pitch acceleration, roll rate, and roll
acceleration, as expected. Note that the reduced range of Mach and altitude considered when
building the self is not affected by this horizontal tail damage. The verification points are well
within the predicted ranges for all variables considered. Only very few points exceed the
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Table 9.11: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Wing Failure











































predicted ranges by small relative amounts, as captured by REI. Relatively large values of MI are
recorded, which seem to indicate that the maneuvers performed were not as aggressive as for the
nominal conditions. Note that the ranges of Mach and altitude for the verification test were
limited, explaining the large values of MI for these two variables.
Table 9.12: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Horizontal Tail Failure











































Table 9.13 presents the predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under the roll rate sensor
failure. The failure consists of a 5°/sec bias in the roll rate sensor output. Two different
verification tests have been performed covering the entire altitude and Mach ranges of the nominal
tests. The results show alterations of the ranges of roll rate and roll acceleration, as expected. The
verification points are all within predicted ranges for both variables considered, as reflected by the
corresponding REI values. The relatively low values of MI show that the predicted limits of the
respective variables are not unrealistically large.
Table 9.13: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Roll Rate Sensor Failure















Listed in Table 9.14 are the predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under the pitch rate
sensor failure. The failure consists of a 5°/sec bias in the pitch rate sensor output. Four different
verification tests have been performed covering the entire altitude and Mach ranges of the nominal
tests. The results show alterations of the ranges of pitch rate and pitch acceleration, as expected.
The high values of PR show that the majority of the verification points are within the predicted
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ranges for all variables considered. Although the values of REI for the pitch acceleration and pitch
attitude angle are relatively high, very few verification points exceed the corresponding predicted
limits, as indicated by the corresponding PR values. The relatively low values of MI lead to the
conclusion that the predicted limits of the respective variables are not unrealistically large.
Table 9.14: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Pitch Rate Sensor Failure















The predicted post-failure flight envelope ranges under the yaw rate sensor failure are listed
in Table 9.15. The failure consists of a 5°/sec bias in the yaw rate sensor output. Four different
verification tests have been performed covering the entire altitude and Mach ranges of the nominal
tests. The results show alterations of the ranges of yaw rate and yaw acceleration, as expected.
Although a rudder failure would be expected to affect sideslip capability, this effect is not captured
because the sideslip range considered for normal operation was already limited within the capability
under failure of such low severity. The verification points are all within predicted ranges for all
variables considered with only insignificant exceedance as reflected by REI. The simultaneous
occurrence of non-zero values of REI and MI reflect the situation when one limit of the predicted
range is exceeded and the other is not reached during the verification tests. The relatively low
values of MI lead to the conclusion that the predicted limits of the respective variables are not
unrealistically large.
Table 9.15: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Yaw Rate Sensor Failure






















Table 9.16 presents the predicted post-failure ranges of relevant variables with left engine
throttle locked at idle. Corresponding nominal ranges and the three performance metrics are also
included. One verification test has been performed covering an altitude range between 6,000 m
and 10,000 m for Mach numbers between 0.7 and 0.9. The results show alterations of the ranges
of the longitudinal and vertical acceleration, and roll rate, as expected. Note that the reduced
range of Mach and altitude considered when building the self is not affected by this failure. The
verification points are well within predicted ranges for all variables considered. Only few points
exceed the predicted ranges by small relative amounts, as captured by REI. The relatively large
values of MI are the result of the verification test not completely covering the maneuver range of
the self-generating data. In particular, the verification test does not include maneuvers between
2,000 m and 6,000 m or for Mach numbers between 0.5 and 0.7.
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Table 9.16: Predicted Flight Envelope and Performance Metrics Under Engine Failure






































Conclusions and Future Work
The generalized algorithmic framework presented in this research provides tools for an integrated
and comprehensive solution to the problem of safe aircraft operation under abnormal conditions.
The main concepts and foundations were established for immunity-based methodologies and
algorithms that are expected to facilitate the design of onboard augmentation systems to increase
aircraft survivability and improve operation safety.
Two methods for generating the AIS antibodies have been presented and compared in terms of
the detection performance and computational resources. The detection performance of the
2-dimensional projections under various types of AC showed that both the RDSUM and CSUM
are equivalent from this point of view. Generating the antibodies with the RDSUM requires more
computer memory as compared to the CSUM. However, the computational time needed by the
RDSUM is less than that required by the CSUM, unless parallel computation is used. The
parameters related to the self/nonself generation (such as the shape, number, and size of the self
clusters and the overlapping between self clusters and detectors) affect both the detection
performance of the subselves and the computational resources required by each method. To
achieve better detection performance with less computational resources, these parameters need to
be tuned through optimization (for example, by using the genetic algorithm suggested in [84]).
Additional nominal flight tests covering a wider range of the flight envelope are expected to
improve the overall detection performance of the generated subselves but at the expense of the
computer memory and computational speed.
Conceptual formulations and computational algorithms have been outlined for aircraft
subsystem failure detection, identification, and evaluation based on the novel artificial DC
mechanism within the AIS paradigm. Implementation results of the proposed DC mechanism for
AC detection show the high capability of the approach in detecting aircraft failures and
minimizing the false alarms rate to 0% for most nominal flights.
Despite their success in some application domains, the DCA proposed by [58] and its variants
[59, 61] rely on the mapping of their input signals to the appropriate parameters of the particular
application. This mapping becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, in complex and
multidimensional systems such as the aircraft. The DCA was based on the behavior of the DCs
that are part of the innate immune system, whereas the principle of self/non-self-discrimination
was based on the functionality of the antibodies in the adaptive immune system. The synergistic
combination of the HMS strategy and the novel artificial DC mechanism presented in this
research effort was inspired from both the functionality of the biological DCs in the innate
immune system and their interaction with the different constituents of the adaptive immune
system (T-cells, B-cells, and antibodies). The artificial DCs in the proposed algorithm take the
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outcomes of the self/non-self-discrimination as the only two signals (safe and danger) that
influence the resulting failure detection, thus overcoming the challenge of mapping the input
signals to the application’s parameters, as required by the original DCA, and facilitating the
implementation to the complex and multidimensional aircraft system.
The ability of the artificial DCs of storing information about each processed nonself and
fusing them in a certain pattern useful for failure identification is another advantage of the
proposed algorithm over the original DCA, which was designed solely for failure detection.
Table 10.1 presents a summary of the qualitative comparison between the original DCA and the
artificial DC mechanism proposed in the research effort.
Table 10.1: Comparison Between the Original DCA and the Arti cial DC Mechanism
Original DC Algorithm Artificial DC Mechanism
Inspired from only the functionality of the
biological DCs in the innate immune system.
Inspired from both the functionality of the
biological DCs in the innate immune system
and their interaction with the different
constituents of the adaptive immune system.
Relies on the mapping of 4 input signals to
the appropriate parameters of the particular
application, which is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, in complex and
multidimensional systems, such as the
aircraft.
Needs only 2 input signals (safe and danger)
from the self/nonself discrimination without
special mapping to the application’s
parameters. Synergistically combined with
the HMS strategy, thus addressing the
complexity and multidimensionality of the
aircraft system.
Designed solely for AC detection. Designed for AC detection, identification,
and qualitative and direct quantitative
evaluation.
While the proposed DC mechanism performs quite similar to the Structured-Nonself Approach
[90] for identification and evaluation, it has the advantage of avoiding structuring the nonself, thus
making the design of the detection, identification, and evaluation schememore streamlined, general,
and consistent.
Tuning the various parameters of the artificial DCmechanism (such as the number of DCs in the
pool and the triggered and nontriggered weights) has to be further investigated in a future research
effort. The detection performance for the cases of throttle failure and engine reduced efficiency can
be improved by considering additional features (such as temperature and pressure) that capture the
dynamic fingerprint of these failures, as investigated in [108].
The results of implementing the features-pattern approach of the DC mechanism for AC
identification, qualitative evaluation, and direct quantitative evaluation showed its high capability
in correctly identifying the failed subsystem and evaluating the type and severity of the failure.
The patterns provided by the migrated DCs in the artificial DC mechanism convert the AC
identification and evaluation problems into pattern-recognition ones. The naïve Bayes classifier
used as the pattern-recognition algorithm in these schemes is limited to classifying the current
pattern as one of the known patterns included in the training phase. In order to identify
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novel/unseen failed subsystems, one can use another classifier which is capable of classifying
unseen patterns, such as Support Vector Machines and Neural Networks [28, 29], keeping in mind
other application-specific requirements that need to be satisfied (e.g., speed and accuracy of the
classification).
The alternative pattern approaches (i.e., the projections-pattern and matrix-pattern) proposed
in Chapter 7 are recommended for future study. Special care should be taken about selecting the
features or projections required for the particular classifier when applying the proposed schemes
to the system under consideration in that they must be distinguishing or informative for the
classifier and invariant to irrelevant data transformation. These features/projections may be
selected via analysis or, more appropriately, by using a selection algorithm such as the wrapper
approaches proposed by Kohavi and John [109].
The average computational time required for the artificial DC mechanism to provide the FDIE
outcome at each time step is about 40 millisecond on Windows® XP Professional 64-bit running
on Intel® CoreTM i7 @ 3.33GHz.
Immunity-based algorithms for the flight envelope prediction at post-failure of various
subsystems have been developed in this work and successfully demonstrated through numerical
examples. The prediction of altered ranges of the relevant flight envelope variables at post-failure
conditions requires prior abnormal condition detection, identification, direct evaluation, and
failure specific algorithms. The performance metrics defined for the purpose of validating the
altered ranges show that the proposed methodology can be used to yield reasonable post-failure
ranges. Future work should address the issues related to the resolution of the self clusters to




The Naïve Bayes Classi er
Naïve Bayes classifier is one of the simplest probabilistic supervised learning algorithms in
machine learning [28]. It is based on the statistical Bayes’ theorem with strong independence
assumption (i.e., the presence or absence of a particular attribute of a class is unrelated to the
presence or absence of any other attribute). Although this assumption is “naïve,” the classifier
surprisingly provides excellent performance (high classification rate) in practice, even when this
assumption is violated. In many practical applications, parameter estimation for naïve Bayes
models uses the method of maximum likelihood or maximum a posteriori (MAP).
Another advantage of the naïve Bayes classifier is that it is very fast in both the learning and
testing phases, even for large datasets [29]. Besides its high speed and performance, the naïve Bayes
classifier works pretty well even when a small amount of training data is available to estimate the
parameters (means and variances of the attributes) necessary for classification.
Let x =

x1 x2    xm
T be an m  1 vector of continuous values of m attributes to be
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Using the chain rule for repeated applications of the definition of the conditional probability,
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where j and †j are the sample mean vector and the sample covariance matrix in class yj,
respectively. The sample mean vector and the sample covariance matrix can be estimated from a





















is the k-th sample in that class, then we have
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The classification decision of the naïve Bayes classifier is based on the mode of Eq. (A.1), i.e., the
MAP, given by
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Since the denominator of the fraction in Eq. (A.8) does not depend on y and the values of the
attributes x are given, therefore, only the numerator affects the classification outcome. Hence,

























and its logarithm attain their maximum values at the same
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can be easily estimated from the given data either by using the
relative frequencies or a more sophisticated estimation method, such as the m-probability estimate











nj is the total number of samples.
Since the second term in Eq. (A.11) is constant, therefore, it can be dropped out without affecting



























































since it does not affect the maximum posterior.
This analysis is called quadratic discrimination analysis since it results in the quadratic discriminant
function in Eq. (A.13).
If we assume the covariance matrices are the same over the classes, i.e.,
†j = † =
26664
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Recalling that † is symmetric and using the properties of the inverse and transpose of matrices, it
can be easily shown that 12Tj †
–1x + 12xT†


















Since both the second and third term in Eq. (A.16) are independent of the class y = yj, therefore,











This is the so called linear discrimination analysis for that it results in the linear discriminant




[1] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, Nhan T. Nguyen, and John T. Kaneshige, Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control,
Encyclopedia of Aerospace Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, 2010, doi: 10.1002/9780470686652.eae510.
[2] Edwards, Christopher, Thomas Lombaerts, and Hafid Smaili, Fault Tolerant Flight Control, Lecture Notes in
Control and Information Sciences, Vol. 399, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2010.
[3] White, John, “NASA’s Aviation Safety Program,” 44th Annual AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Reno, NV,
Jan. 2006.
[4] Kwatny, Harry, Celeste Belcastro, Christine M. Belcastro, and Bor-Chin Chang, “Aircraft Loss-of-Control
Accident Prevention, Part I: Safety State Assessment and Preliminary Results,” Proceedings of the AIAA
Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference, Honolulu, HI, Aug. 2008, doi: 10.2514/6.2008-6506.
[5] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, and Karen Gundy-Burlet, “Intelligent Control Approaches for Aircraft Applications,”
ANAFF Interagency Propulsion Committee Meeting, Destin, FL, 2002.
[6] Jacobson, Steven R., “Aircraft Loss of Control Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges,” Proceedings of the
AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference, Toronto, Canada, Aug. 2010, doi: 10.2514/6.2010-8007.
[7] Zhang, Youmin, and Jin Jiang, “Bibliographical Review on Reconfigurable Fault-Tolerant Control Systems,”
Annual Reviews in Control, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2008, pp. 229–252, doi: 10.1016/j.arcontrol.2008.03.008.
[8] Campbell, Stefan F., John T. Kaneshige, Nhan T. Nguyen, and Kalmanje KrishnaKumar, “Implementation and
Evaluation of Multiple Adaptive Control Technologies for a Generic Transport Aircraft Simulation,” Proceedings
of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace Conference, Atlanta, GA, Aug. 2010, doi: 10.2514/6.2010-3322.
[9] Nguyen, Nhan T., and Kalmanje KrishnaKumar, “Hybrid Intelligent Flight Control with Adaptive Learning
Parameter Estimation,” Journal of Aerospace Computing, Information, and Communication, Vol. 6, 2009,
pp. 171–186, doi: 10.2514/1.35929.
[10] Azam, Mohammad, Krishna Pattipati, Jeffrey Allanach, Scott Poll, and Ann Patterson-Hine, “In-Flight Fault
Detection and Isolation in Aircraft Flight Control Systems,” IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, March
2005, pp. 3555–3565, doi: 10.1109/AERO.2005.1559659.
[11] Oonk, Stephen, Francisco J. Maldonado, Fernando Figueroa, and Ching-Fang Lin, “Predictive Fault Diagnosis
System for Intelligent and Robust Health Monitoring,” Journal of Aerospace Computing, Information, and
Communication, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2012, pp. 125–143, doi: 10.2514/1.54961.
[12] Boskovic, Jovan D., Joshua Redding, and Nathan Knoebel, “An Adaptive Fault Management (AFM) System for
Resilient Flight Control,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Chicago, IL,
2009, doi: 10.2514/6.2009-6263.
[13] Unnikrishnan, Suraj, and J. V. R. Prasad, “Carefree Handling using Reactionary Envelope Protection Method,”
Proceedings of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace Conference, Keystone, CO, Aug. 2006, doi: 10.2514/6.2006-6219.
115
116 Bibliography
[14] Yavrucuk, Ilkay, J. V. R. Prasad, and Suraj Unnikrishnan, “Envelope Protection for Autonomous Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2009, pp. 248–261, doi: 10.2514/1.35265.
[15] Tang, Liang, Michael Roemer, Jianhua Ge, Agamemnon Crassidis, J. V. R. Prasad, and Christine M.
Belcastro, “Methodologies for Adaptive Flight Envelope Estimation and Protection,” Proceedings of the AIAA
Infotech@Aerospace Conference, Chicago, IL, Aug. 2009, doi: 10.2514/6.2009-6260.
[16] Keller, Jeffrey D., Robert M. McKillip, and Sungwan Kim, “Aircraft Flight Envelope Determination using Upset
Detection and Physical ModelingMethods,” Proceedings of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace Conference, Chicago,
IL, Aug. 2009, doi: 10.2514/6.2009-6259.
[17] Urnes, James M., Eric Y. Reichenbach, and Timothy A. Smith, “Dynamic Flight Envelope Assessment and
Prediction,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference, Honolulu, HI, Aug. 2008,
doi: 10.2514/6.2008-6983.
[18] Pandita, Rohit, Abhijit Chakraborty, Peter Seiler, and Gary Balas, “Reachability and Region of Attraction
Analysis Applied to GTMDynamic Flight Envelope Assessment,” Proceedings of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace
Conference, Chicago, IL, Aug. 2009, doi: 10.2514/6.2009-6258.
[19] Gingras, David R., Billy Barnhart, Richard Ranaudo, Borja Martos, Thomas P. Ratvasky, and Eugene
Morelli, “Development and Implementation of a Model-Driven Envelope Protection System for In-Flight Ice
Contamination,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference, Toronto, Canada, Aug.
2010, doi: 10.2514/6.2010-8141.
[20] Frank, PaulM., and J.Wünnenberg, Robust Fault Diagnosis Using Unknown Input Observer Schemes, Ron Patton,
Paul M. Frank, and R. Clark, editors, Fault Diagnosis in Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications, Prentice
Hall, NY, 1989, pp. 47–98.
[21] Frank, Paul M., “Online Fault Detection in Uncertain Nonlinear Systems Using Diagnostic Observers:
A Survey,” International Journal of Systems Science, Vol. 25, No. 12, 1994, pp. 2129–2154, doi:
10.1080/00207729408949341.
[22] Chow, Edward Y., and Alan S. Willsky, “Analytical Redundancy and the Design of Robust Failure
Detection Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 1984, pp. 603–614, doi:
10.1109/TAC.1984.1103593.
[23] Gertler, Janos J., Xiaowen Fang, and Qiang Luo, Detection and Diagnosis of Plant Failures: The Orthogonal
Parity Equation Approach, Vol. 37, Control and Dynamic Systems, Academic Press, San Diego, CA, 1990, pp.
159–216.
[24] Basseville, Michèle, andAlbert Benveniste,Detection of Abrupt Changes in Signals andDynamic Systems, Lecture
Notes in Control and Information Sciences, Vol. 77, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 1986.
[25] Isermann, Rolf, Process Fault Diagnosis Based on Dynamic Models and Parameter Estimation Methods, Ron
Patton, Paul M. Frank, and R. Clark, editors, Fault Diagnosis in Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications,
Prentice Hall, NY, 1989, pp. 253–291.
[26] Cheung, J. T.-Y., and , “Representation of Process Trends, Part I: A formal Representation Framework,”
International Journal of Computers and Chemical Engineering, Vol. 14, No. 4-5, May 1990, pp. 495–510, doi:
10.1016/0098-1354(90)87023-I.
[27] Vedam, Hiranmayee, and Venkat Venkatasubramanian, “A Wavelet Theory-Based Adaptive Trend Analysis
System for Process Monitoring and Diagnosis,” Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Vol. 1, IEEE,
Albuquerque, NM, June 1997, pp. 309–313, doi: 10.1109/ACC.1997.611807.
[28] Bishop, Christopher M., Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning, Springer, Singapore, 2006.
Bibliography 117
[29] Murphy, Kevin P., Machine Learning: A Probabilistic Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006.
[30] MacGregor, John F., and Theodora Kourti, “Statistical Process Control of Multivariate Processes,” Control
Engineering Practice, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1995, pp. 403–414, doi: 10.1016/0967-0661(95)00014-L.
[31] Li, R. F., and X. Z. Wang, “Qualitative/Quantitative Simulation of Process Temporal Behavior Using Clustered
Fuzzy Digraphs,” American Institute of Chemical Engineers Journal, Vol. 27, No. 4, April 2001, pp. 906–919,
doi: 10.1002/aic.690470413.
[32] Ulerich, N. H., and G. A. Powers, “Online Hazard Aversion and Fault Diagnosis in Chemical Processes: The
Digraph + Fault-Tree Method,” IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 1988, pp. 171–177, doi:
10.1109/24.3738.
[33] Peng, Y., and J. A. Reggia, “A Probabilistic Causal Model for Diagnostic Problem Solving, Part II: Diagnostic
Search,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Vol. 17, No. 3, May 1987, pp. 395–406, doi:
10.1109/TSMC.1987.4309056.
[34] Becraft, W., and P. Lee, “An Integrated Neural Network/Expert System Approach for Fault Diagnosis,”
International Journal of Computers and Chemical Engineering, Vol. 17, No. 10, Oct. 1993, pp. 1001–1014, doi:
10.1016/0098-1354(93)80081-W.
[35] Chen, Lioun Wee, and M. Modarres, “Hierarchical Decision Process for Fault Administration,” International
Journal of Computers and Chemical Engineering, Vol. 16, No. 5, May 1992, pp. 425–448, doi: 10.1016/0098-
1354(92)85009-W.
[36] Rich, StevenH., andVenkat Venkatasubramanian, “Causality-Based Failure-Driven Learning inDiagnostic Expert
Systems,” American Institute of Chemical Engineers Journal, Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1989, pp. 943–950, doi:
10.1002/aic.690350607.
[37] Zhao, Jinsong, Bingzhen Chen, and Jingzhu Shen, “A Hybrid ANN-ES System for Dynamic Fault Diagnosis
of Hydrocracking Process,” International Journal of Computers and Chemical Engineering, Vol. 21, No.
Supplement, May 1997, pp. S929–S933, doi: 10.1016/S0098-1354(97)87621-1.
[38] Belcastro, Christine M., and Steven R. Jacobson, “Future Integrated Systems Concept for Preventing Aircraft
Loss-of-Control Accidents,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference, Toronto,
Canada, Aug. 2010, doi: 10.2514/6.2010-8142.
[39] Belcastro, Christine M., “Validation and Verification of Future Integrated Safety-Critical Systems Operating under
Off-Nominal Conditions,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference, Toronto,
Canada, Aug. 2010, doi: 10.2514/6.2010-8143.
[40] Roemer, Michael, Liang Tang, Sudarshan Bharadwaj, and Celeste Belcastro, “An Integrated Aircraft Health
Assessment and Fault Contingency Management System,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation and
Control Conference, Honolulu, HI, Aug. 2008, doi: 10.2514/6.2008-6505.
[41] Figueroa, Fernando, John Schmalzel, Mark Walker, Meera Venkatesh, Ravi Kapadia, Jon Morris, Mark
Turowski, and Harvey Smith, “Integrated System Health Management: Foundational Concepts, Approach, and
Implementation,” Proceedings of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace Conference, Seattle, WA, April 2009, doi:
10.2514/6.2009-1915.
[42] Farmer, J. Doyne, Norman H. Parkard, and Alan S. Perelson, “The Immune System, Adaptation, and Machine
Learning,” Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, Vol. 22, No. 1-3, 1986, pp. 187–204, doi: 10.1016/0167-
2789(86)90240-X.
[43] Castro, Leandro Nunes, and Jonathan Timmis, Artificial Immune Systems: A New Computation Intelligence
Approach, Springer, 2002.
118 Bibliography
[44] Dasgupta, Dipankar, Kalmanje KrishnaKumar, D. Wong, and Misty Berry, “Negative Selection Algorithm for
Aircraft Fault Detection,” Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Catania,
Sicily, Sept. 2004, pp. 1–13, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-30220-9_1.
[45] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, “Artificial Immune System Approaches for Aerospace Applications,” Proceedings of
the 41st Aerospace Sciences Meeting & Exhibit, Reno, NV, April 2003, doi: 10.2514/6.2003-457.
[46] González, Fabio, A Study of Artificial Immune Systems Applied to Anomaly Detection, Ph.D. thesis, The University
of Memphis, Memphis, TN, 2003.
[47] Yeom, Ki-Won, Immune-Inspired Algorithm for Anomaly Detection, Computational Intelligence in Information
Assurance and Security, Vol. 57, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 2007, pp. 129–154, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-
71078-3_5.
[48] Castro, Leandro Nunes, and Fernando J. Von Zuben, aiNet: An Artificial Immune Network for Data Analysis, H.
A. Abbas, R. A. S. Charles and S. Newton, editors, Data Mining: A Heuristic Approach, Idea Group Publishing,
Hershey, PA, 2001, pp. 231–259, doi: 10.4018/978-1-930708-25-9.ch012.
[49] Nasraoui, Olfa, Dipankar Dasgupta, and Fabio González, “A Novel Artificial Immune System Approach to Robust
Data Mining,” Proceedings of the International Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, New York,
NY, July 2002, pp. 356–363.
[50] Forrest, Stepahnie, Steven A. Hofmeyr, Anil Somayaji, and Thomas A. Longstaff, “A Sense of Self for Unix
Processes,” Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Computer Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, July 1996, pp.
120–128, doi: 10.1109/SECPRI.1996.502675.
[51] Singh, Surya, and ScottM. Thayer, “ImmunologyDirectedMethods for Distributed Robotics: ANovel, Immunity-
Based Architecture for Robust Control and Coordination,” Proceedings of SPIE: Mobile Robots XVI, Vol. 4573,
Boston, MA, Oct. 2001, doi: 10.1117/12.457453.
[52] Lee, Jongan, Mootaek Roh, Jinsung Lee, and Doheon Lee, “Clonal Selection Algorithms for 6-DOF PID Control
of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles,” Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Artificial Immune
Systems, Santos, Brazil, Aug. 2007, pp. 182–190, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-73922-7_16.
[53] Carter, Jerome H., “The Immune System as a Model for Pattern Recognition and Classification,” Journal
of the American Medical Informatics Association, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2000, pp. 29–41, doi:
10.1136/jamia.2000.0070028.
[54] Castro, Leandro Nunes, and Jonathan Timmis, Artificial Immune Systems: A Novel Approach to Pattern
Recognition, J. Corchado, L. Alonso, and C. Fyfe, editors, Artificial Neural Networks in Pattern Recognition,
University of Paisley, UK, Jan. 2002, pp. 67–84.
[55] Avizienis, Algirdas, “Toward Systematic Design of Fault-Tolerant System,” Computer, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 1997,
pp. 51–58, doi: 10.1109/2.585154.
[56] Matzinger, Polly, “The Danger Model: A Renewed Sense of Self,” Science, Vol. 296, No. 5566, April 2002,
pp. 301–305, doi: 10.1126/science.1071059.
[57] Greensmith, Julie, Jamie Twycross, and Uwe Aickelin, “Dendritic Cells for Anomaly Detection,” Proceedings
of the 6th IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, Vancouver, BC, 2006, pp. 664–671, doi:
10.1109/CEC.2006.1688374.
[58] Greensmith, Julie, The Dendritic Cell Algorithm, Ph.D. thesis, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK, Oct.
2007.
Bibliography 119
[59] Greensmith, Julie, and Uwe Aickelin, “The Deterministic Dendritic Cell Algorithm,” Proceedings of the
7th International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Phuket, Thailand, May 2008, pp. 291–302, doi:
10.1007/978-3-540-85072-4_26.
[60] Mokhtar, Maizura, Ran Bi, Jonanthan Timmis, and Andy M. Tyrrell, “A Modified Dendritic Cell Algorithm for
Online Error Detection in Robotic Systems,” IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, Trondheim, Norway,
May 2009, pp. 2055–2062, doi: 10.1109/CEC.2009.4983194.
[61] Chelly, Zeineb, and Zied Elouedi, “FDCM: A Fuzzy Dendritic Cell Method,” Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Edinburgh, UK, July 2010, pp. 102–115, doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-
14547-6_9.
[62] Dasgupta, Dipankar, editor, Artificial Immune Systems and Their Applications, Springer, 1999, doi: 10.1007/978-
3-642-59901-9.
[63] Janeway, Charles A., Paul Travers, Mark Walport, and Mark Shlomchik, Immunobiology: The Immune System in
Health and Disease, Garland Science, New York, 6th ed., 2005.
[64] Steinman, Ralph M., and Zanvil A. Cohn, “Identification of a Novel Cell Type in Peripheral Lymphoid
Organs of Mice,” Journal of Experimental Medicine, Vol. 137, No. 5, May 1973, pp. 1142–1162, doi:
10.1084/jem.137.5.1142.
[65] Steinman, Ralph M., “Introduction to Dendritic Cells,” Laboratory of Cellular Physiology and Immunology, The
Rockefeller University official site available at http://lab.rockefeller.edu/steinman/dendritic_intro/, last accessed
Jan. 2013.
[66] Banchereau, Jacques, and Ralph M. Steinman, “Dendritic Cells and the Control of Immunity,” Nature, Vol. 392,
March 1998, doi: 10.1038/32588.
[67] Pletinckx, Katrien, Anja Döhler, Vladimir Pavlovic, and Manfred B. Lutz, “Role of Dendritic Cell
Maturity/Costimulation for Generation, Homeostasis, and Suppressive Activity of Regulatory T-Cells,” Frontiers
in Immunology, Vol. 2, Sept. 2011, doi: 10.3389/fimmu.2011.00039.
[68] Segel, Lee A., and Irun R. Cohen, Design Principles for the Immune System and Other Distributed Autonomous
Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2001.
[69] Ko, Albert, H. Y. K. Lau, and T. L. Lau, “An Immuno Control Framework for DecentralizedMechatronic Control,”
Internation Journal of Unconventional Computing, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2005, pp. 255–280.
[70] Luh, Guan-Chun, Chun-Yin Wu, and Wei-Chong Cheng, “Artificial Immune Regulation (AIR) for Model-Based
Fault Diagnosis,” Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Catania, Sicily,
Sept. 2004, pp. 28–41, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-30220-9_3.
[71] Guzella, Thiago S., Tomaz A. Mota-Santos, and Walmir M. Caminhas, “A Novel Immune Inspired Approach to
Fault Detection,” Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Santos, Brazil,
Aug. 2007, pp. 107–118, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-73922-7_10.
[72] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, A. Satyadas, and J. C. Neidhoefer, “An Immune System Framework for Integrating
Computational Intelligence Paradigms,” Computational Intelligence, A Dynamic Perspective, IEEE Press,
Washington, 1995.
[73] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, and J. C. Neidhoefer, “Immunized Neurocontrol,” Journal of Expert Systems
Application, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1997, pp. 201–214.
[74] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, and J. C. Neidhoefer, Immunized Adaptive Critics, ICNN, Houston, TX, 1997, doi:
10.1109/ICNN.1997.614406.
120 Bibliography
[75] KrishnaKumar, Kalmanje, and J. C. Neidhoefer, Immunized Adaptive Critic for an Autonomous Aircraft Control
Application, Dipankar Dasgupta, editor, Artificial Immune Systems and Their Applications, Springer, 1999, pp.
221–241, doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-59901-9_12.
[76] Ootsuki, J. T., and T. Sekiguchi, “Application of the Immune System Network Concept to Sequential Control,”
Vol. 3, Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Tokyo, Japan, 1999,
pp. 869–874, doi: 10.1109/ICSMC.1999.823342.
[77] Kaneshige, John T., and Kalmanje KrishnaKumar, “Artificial Immune System Approach for Air Combat
Maneuvering,” Proceedings of SPIE 6560, Intelligent Computing: Theory and Applications V, Orlando, Florida,
2007, doi: 10.1117/12.718892.
[78] Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, and Jennifer Davis, “Integrated Framework for Artificial Immunity-Based
Aircraft Failure Detection, Identification, and Evaluation,” AIAA Journal of Aircraft, Vol. 47, No. 6, Nov.-Dec.
2010, pp. 1847–1859, doi: 10.2514/1.45718.
[79] Moncayo, Hever, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Jennifer Davis, “Aircraft Failure Detection and Identification Using
an Immunological Hierarchical Multiself Strategy,” AIAA Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 33,
No. 4, July 2010, pp. 1105–1114, doi: 10.2514/1.47445.
[80] Moncayo, Hever, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Jennifer Davis, “Aircraft Failure Detection and Identification Over an
Extended Flight Envelope Using an Artificial Immune System,” The Aeronautical Journal, Vol. 115, No. 1163,
Jan. 2011, pp. 43–55.
[81] Moncayo, Hever, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Jennifer Davis, “Artificial Immune System-Based Aircraft Failure
Evaluation Over Extended Flight Envelope,” AIAA Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 34, No. 4,
July-Aug. 2011, pp. 9890–1001, doi: 10.2514/6.2010-8038.
[82] Moncayo, Hever, Mario G. Perhinschi, Brenton Wilburn, Jennifer Wilburn, and Ondrej Karas, “UAV Adaptive
Control Laws Using Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion Augmented with an Immunity-basedMechanism,” Proceedings
of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Minneapolis, MN, Aug. 2012, doi: 10.2514/6.2012-
4678.
[83] Davis, Jennifer, The Design of an Evolutionary Algorithm for Artificial Immune System Based Failure Detector
Generation and Optimization, Master’s thesis, West Virginia University, Aug. 2010.
[84] Davis, Jennifer, MarioG. Perhinschi, andHeverMoncayo, “EvolutionaryAlgorithm forArtificial Immune System-
Based FailureDetector Generation andOptimization,” AIAA Journal of Guidance, Control, andDynamics, Vol. 33,
No. 2, March-April 2010, pp. 302–320, doi: 10.2514/1.46126.
[85] Oates, Robert, Julie Greensmith, Uwe Aickelin, Jonathan Garibaldi, and Graham Kendall, “The Application of a
Dendritic Cell Algorithm to a Robotic Classifier,” Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Artificial
Immune Systems, 2007, pp. 204–215, doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-73922-7_18.
[86] Ogundipe, Oluropo, Julie Greensmith, and Gethin Roberts, “Multipath Detection Using the Dendritic Cell
Algorithm,” XXIV FIG International Congress, 2010, pp. 1–14.
[87] Bendiab, Esma, andMohamedK. Kholladi, “AMethod for Plant Classification Based onArtificial Immune System
andWavelet Transform,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Digital Information and Communication
Technology and Its Applications, Dijon, France, June 2011, pp. 199–208, doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-21984-9_17.
[88] Amaral, Jorge L., “Fault Detection in Analog Circuits Using a Fuzzy Dendritic Cell Algorithm,” Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Cambridge, UK, July 2011, pp. 294–307, doi:
10.1007/978-3-642-22371-6_26.
Bibliography 121
[89] Pinto, Jose Carlos L., and Fernando J. Von Zuben, “Fault Detection Algorithm for Telephone Systems Based on the
Danger Theory,” Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, Banff, Alberta,
Aug. 2005, pp. 418–431, doi: 10.1007/11536444_32.
[90] Moguel, Israel, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Andres Perez, Dia Al Azzawi, and Adil Togayev,
“Structured Nonself Approach for Aircraft Failure Identification Within an Immunity-Based Fault Tolerance
Architecture,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, Jan. 2014, submitted, Manuscript ID:
TAES-201400058.
[91] Sagoo, Girish K., Srikanth Gururajan, Marcello R. Napolitano, Mario G. Perhinschi, Gu Yu, and Brad Seanor,
“Pilot-in-the-Loop Assessment of Neurally Augmented Dynamic Inversion Based Fault Tolerant Control Laws in
a Motion-Based Flight Simulator,” AIAA Guidance, Navigation and Control Conference and Exhibit, Honolulu,
Hawaii, Aug. 2008, doi: 10.2514/6.2008-6843.
[92] Meyer, Austin, and H. Van Kampen, X-Plane Online Instruction Manual, Laminar Research Inc., Columbia, SC,
8th ed., 2002.
[93] Perhinschi, Mario G., and Marcello R. Napolitano, “Teaching Aircraft Health Management: A Simulation-Based
Approach,” Computers in Education Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, Oct.-Dec. 2009, pp. 1–10.
[94] Antoniewicz, Robert F., Eugene L. Duke, and Brian P. Patterson, “User’s Manual for Interactive LINEAR, a
Fortran Program to Derive Linear Aircraft Models,” 1988.
[95] Perhinschi, Mario G., Marcello R. Napolitano, Giampiero Campa, and Mario L. Fravolini, “A Simulation
Environment for Testing and Research of Neurally Augmented Fault Tolerant Control Laws Based on Nonlinear
Dynamic Inversion,” Proceedings of the AIAA Modeling and Simulation Technologies Conference, Providence,
RI, Aug. 2004, doi: 10.2514/6.2004-4913.
[96] Moncayo, Hever, and Mario G. Perhinschi, Aircraft Fault Tolerance: A Biologically Inspired Immune Framework
for Subsystem Failures, VDM Verlag Dr. Muller GmbH & Co. KG, VDM Publishing House ltd., Saarbruecken,
Germany, 2011.
[97] Perhinschi, Mario G., Giampiero Campa, Marcello R. Napolitano, M. Lando, L. Massotti, and Mario L.
Fravolini, “Modeling and Simulation of a Fault Tolerant Control System,” International Journal of Modelling
and Simulation, Vol. 26, No. 1, Jan. 2006, pp. 1–10, doi: 10.2316/Journal.205.2006.1.205-4044.
[98] Perhinschi, Mario G., Marcello R. Napolitano, Giampiero Campa, Mario L. Fravolini, and Brad Seanor,
“Integration of Sensor and Actuator Failure Detection, Identification, and Accommodation Schemes within
Fault Tolerant Control Laws,” Control and Intelligent Systems, Vol. 35, No. 4, Dec. 2007, pp. 309–318, doi:
10.2316/Journal.201.2007.4.201-1657.
[99] Moncayo, Hever, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Jennifer Davis, “Simulation Environment for the Development
and Testing of Immunity-Based Aircraft Failure Detection Schemes,” Proceedings of the AIAA Modeling and
Simulation Technologies Conference, Portland, OR, Aug. 2011, doi: 10.2514/6.2011-6697.
[100] Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, Dia Al Azzawi, and Israel Moguel, “Generation of Artificial Immune
System Antibodies Using Raw Data and Cluster Set Union,” IC: International Journal of Immune Computation,
Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2014, pp. 1–15, http://www.aicit.org/ic/global/paper_detail.html?jname=IC&q=82.
[101] Moncayo, Hever, Immunity-Based Detection, Identification, and Evaluation of Aircraft Subsystem Failures, Ph.D.
thesis, West Virginia University, 2009.
[102] Steinman, Ralph M., and H. Hemmi, Dendritic Cells: Translating Innate to Adaptive Immunity, Bali Pulendran
and Rafi Ahmed, editors, Current Topics in Microbiology and Immunology, Vol. 311, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Germany, 2006, pp. 17–58, doi: 10.1007/3-540-32636-7_2.
122 Bibliography
[103] Tarbell, Kristin V., Sayuri Yamazaki, and Ralph M. Steinman, “The Interactions of Dendritic Cells with Antigen-
Specific, Regulatory T-Cells that Suppress Autoimmunity,” Seminars in Immunology, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2006,
pp. 93–102, doi: 10.1016/j.smim.2006.01.009.
[104] Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Hever Moncayo, “Dendritic Cell Mechanism for Aircraft Immunity-
Based Failure Detection and Identification,” Proceedings of the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control
Conference, Boston, MA, Aug. 2013, doi: 10.2514/6.2013-5185.
[105] Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, and Hever Moncayo, “Artificial Dendritic Cell Mechanism for Aircraft
Immunity-Based Failure Detection and Identification,” AIAA Journal of Aerospace Information Systems, Vol. 11,
No. 7, July 2014, pp. 536–550, doi: 10.2514/1.I010214.
[106] Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, and Dia Al Azzawi, “Development of Immunity-Based Framework for
Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Detection, Identification, Evaluation, and Accommodation,” Proceedings of the
AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Boston, MA, Aug. 2013, doi: 10.2514/6.2013-5184.
[107] Al Azzawi, Dia, Mario G. Perhinschi, Hever Moncayo, Adil Togayev, Andres Perez, and Israel Moguel,
“Evaluating Aircraft Abnormal Conditions Using an Artificial Dendritic Cell Mechanism,” 2nd International
Conference and Exhibition on Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering, Philadelphia, PA, Sept. 2014.
[108] Perhinschi, Mario G., Jaclyn Porter, Hever Moncayo, Jennifer Davis, and Scott Wayne, “Artificial-Immune-
System-Based Detection Scheme for Aircraft Engine Failures,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics,
Vol. 34, No. 5, Sep.-Oct. 2011, pp. 1423–1440, doi: 10.2514/1.52746.
[109] Kohavi, Ron, and George H. John, “Wrappers for Feature Subset Selection,” Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 97, No.
1-2, Dec. 1997, pp. 273–324, doi: 10.1016/S0004-3702(97)00043-X.
[110] Al Azzawi, Dia, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Andres Perez, and Adil Togayev, “Comparison of
Immunity-Based Schemes for Aircraft Failure Detection and Identification,” IEEE Computational Intelligence
Magazine, June 2014.
[111] Moguel, Israel, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Andres Perez, Dia Al Azzawi, and Adil Togayev, “Bio-
Inspired Approach for Aircraft Health Assessment and Flight Envelope Estimation,” ASME 2014 Dynamic
Systems & Control Conference, San Antonio, TX, Oct. 2014.
[112] Perez, Andres, Hever Moncayo, Israel Moguel, Mario G. Perhinschi, Dia Al Azzawi, and Adil Togayev,
“Immunity-Based Adaptive Control Laws for Aircraft Fault Tolerance,” ASME 2014 Dynamic Systems & Control
Conference, San Antonio, TX, Oct. 2014.
[113] Perhinschi, Mario G., Hever Moncayo, and Dia Al Azzawi, “Integrated Immunity-Based Framework for Aircraft
Abnormal Conditions Management,” AIAA Journal of Aircraft, April 2013, accepted for publication, Manuscript
ID: 2013-04-C032381.R1.
[114] Perhinschi, Mario G., and Dia Al Azzawi, “Undergraduate Experiential Learning Lab for Aircraft Parameter
Identification,” Computers in Education (CoED) Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, April-June 2014, pp. 79–92.
[115] Perhinschi, Mario G., Dia Al Azzawi, Hever Moncayo, Adil Togayev, and Andres Perez, “Immunity-Based Flight
Envelope Prediction at Post-Failure Conditions,” AIAA Journal of Aerospace Information Systems, June 2014.
[116] Togayev, Adil, Mario G. Perhinschi, Dia Al Azzawi, Hever Moncayo, Israel Moguel, and Andres Perez,
“Immunity-Based Abnormal Condition Accommodation of Aircraft Subsystem Failures,” ASME 2014 Dynamic
Systems & Control Conference, San Antonio, TX, Oct. 2014.
[117] Perez, Andres, Hever Moncayo, Mario G. Perhinschi, Adil Togayev, and Dia Al Azzawi, “Pilot-in-the-Loop
Evaluation of a Bio-Inspired Adaptive Fault Tolerant Control System in a Motion Based Flight Simulator,” AIAA







detection and identification (ACDI), 2
detection, identification, and evaluation (ACDIE),
1, 37
detection, identification, evaluation, and
accommodation (ACDIEA), 2
direct quantitaive evaluation (ACDQE), 14
direct quantitative evaluation (ACDQE), 55
identification, 13
indirect quantitaive evaluation (ACIQE), 15
indirect quantitative evaluation (ACIQE), 57
qualitative evaluation (ACQE), 53
quanlitative evaluation (ACQE), 14









horizontal tail, 27, 73–74
pitch rate sensor, 27, 68–69
propulsion, 26–28
roll rate sensor, 27, 67–68
rudder, 26, 63–64
sensors, 26–28
stabilator, 26, 60–62, 82
structure, 26–28
throttle, 27, 64–67
vertical tail, 27, 74–75
wing, 27, 70–73
yaw rate sensor, 27, 69–70
Al Azzawi, Dia, 121, 122
Allanach, Jeffrey, 115
Amaral, Jorge L., 120
Antibodies, 10, 20, 31
generation of, 31
cluster set union method (CSUM), 32–36, 79
raw data set union method (RDSUM), 32–35, 79
Antigens, 3, 7–12, 43
Antoniewicz, Robert F., 121
Artificial intelligence, 2, 7








Belcastro, Celeste, 115, 117






Bishop, Christopher M., 116
Boskovic, Jovan D., 115
Caminhas, Walmir M., 119
Campa, Giampiero, 121
Campbell, Stefan F., 115
Carter, Jerome H., 118
Castro, Leandro Nunes, 117, 118
Cell
antigen presenting (APC), 9
antigen-presenting (APC), 3
B-, 7–10
cytotoxic T-, 9, 44










Chen, Lioun Wee, 117
Cheng, Wei-Chong, 119
Cheung, J. T.-Y., 116
Chow, Edward Y., 116
123
124 Index
Classification rate, 50, 111
Cohen, Irun R., 119











for AC detection, 40
for AC identification, 47
Detection rate, 80
Detectors, 11, 20, 31
generation of, see generation of antibodies







Self/nonself, see Self/nonself discrimination




Envelope related variable (ERV), 57





detection and identification (FDI), 12
detection, identification, and evaluation (FDIE), 26
engine, 27, 75–77
horizontal tail, 27, 73–74
pitch rate sensor, 68–69




type, see qualitative evaluation
vertical tail, 27, 74–75
wing, 27, 70–73
yaw rate sensor, 69–70
False alarms, 2, 21, 40–43, 80
Fang, Xiaowen, 116





Figueroa, Fernando, 115, 117
Flight envelope, 2, 12




Frank, Paul M., 116
Fravolini, Mario L., 121
Garibaldi, Jonathan, 120
Ge, Jianhua, 116
Gertler, Janos J., 116





Guzella, Thiago S., 119
Hemmi, H., 121
Hierarchical multiself (HMS), 12, 19, 36, 40
Hofmeyr, Steven A., 118
Identifiers, 20
Immune system, 2
adaptive, 7, 9, 40





Jacobson, Steven R., 115, 117
Janeway, Charles A., 119
Jiang, Jin, 115
John, George H., 122
Kampen, H. Van, 121
Kaneshige, John T., 115, 120
Kapadia, Ravi, 117
Karas, Ondrej, 120
Keller, Jeffrey D., 116
Kendall, Graham, 120










Lau, H. Y. K., 119





Li, R. F., 117
Life, of a dendritic cell, 44
Lin, Ching-Fang, 115
Lombaerts, Thomas, 115
Longstaff, Thomas A., 118
Luh, Guan-Chun, 119
Luo, Qiang, 116
Lutz, Manfred B., 119
Lymphocytes, 7
MacGregor, John F., 117
Machine learning, 50
Major histocompatibility complex, 8, 9





Maximum a posteriori (MAP), 111, 112
Maximum likelihood, 111
McKillip, Robert M., 116
Meyer, Austin, 121
Modarres, M., 117





Mota-Santos, Tomaz A., 119
Murphy, Kevin P., 117
Napolitano, Marcello R., 121
Nasraoui, Olfa, 118
Naïve Bayes classifier, 50, 111
Negative selection, 10, 11, 35, 39
Neidhoefer, J. C., 119, 120
Neural network output, 33, 79
Nguyen, Nhan T., 115
Nonself, 10, 15, 18
clustering, see generation of antibodies




Ootsuki, J. T., 120
Pandita, Rohit, 116






recognition, 3, 12, 47, 50
reference, 47





Perelson, Alan S., 117
Perez, Andres, 121, 122
Perhinschi, Mario G., 120–122
Phagocytes, 7–10





Powers, G. A., 117






Range exceedance index, 101
Ratvasky, Thomas P., 116
Redding, Joshua, 115
Reggia, J. A., 117
Reichenbach, Eric Y., 116
Rich, Steven H., 117
Roberts, Gethin, 120
Roemer, Michael, 116, 117
Roh, Mootaek, 118




Segel, Lee A., 119
Seiler, Peter, 116
Sekiguchi, T., 120
Self, 8, 15, 18
clustering, see Data clustering
clusters, 20, 31, 35







Smith, Timothy A., 116
Somayaji, Anil, 118
Steinman, Ralph M., 119, 121, 122
Stephanopoulos, G., 116
Structured nonself approach, 20
Subself, 16, 42
Subselves, 16, 19, 40
analysis tool, 37
Supervised learning, 50
Tang, Liang, 116, 117
Tarbell, Kristin V., 122
Thayer, Scott M., 118
Timmis, Jonathan, 117–119
Togayev, Adil, 121, 122
Training tests, 47
Travers, Paul, 119
Triggered features matrix, 44
Turowski, Mark, 117
Twycross, Jamie, 118
Tyrrell, Andy M., 119
Ulerich, N. H., 117
Unnikrishnan, Suraj, 115, 116
Urnes, James M., 116
Validation tests, 47
Vedam, Hiranmayee, 116
Venkatasubramanian, Venkat, 116, 117
Venkatesh, Meera, 117
Von Zuben, Fernando J., 118
Walker, Mark, 117
Walport, Mark, 119















Zuben, Fernando J. Von, 121
